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Conservation Easements and the Development of New 
Energies: Fracking, Wind Turbines, and Solar 
Collection 
Gerald Korngold∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of European settlers, there have been 
competing visions for the use of American land. The traditional 
ethos has been full development of resources in order to meet the 
needs of a growing population and country. People differed, and 
even battled at times, as to the direction and type of this 
development. Two examples of this conflict are the cattle wars in 
the West and disputes over the spillovers of industrial activities 
into residential areas. Yet, throughout the first 200 years of the 
American Republic, development of land resources in some form 
was the dominant principle. 
Over the past two generations, however, a new 
environmentalism ethic has emerged.1 Currently this ethos is quite 
pervasive, and is reflected in legislation and governmental 
programs, sustainability strategies of companies, and various 
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 ∗ Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Fellow, Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. I wish to thank the Property 
and Environment Research Center (PERC) for a grant supporting the writing of 
this Article. Of course, all errors, opinions, and assertions are mine alone. 
 1. The land conservation movement in the United States has roots in the 
19th and early 20th centuries. John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892, at the 
dawn of the second American century, and has grown to a membership of 1.4 
million people. See Who was John Muir?, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub 
.org/john_muir_exhibit/about/, archived at http://perma.cc/LMS6-NX8W (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2014). The first non-governmental land trust, the Trustees of 
Public Reservations, was established in 1891 dedicated to acquiring and holding 
“for the benefit of the public, beautiful and historic places in Massachusetts.” 
RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 
13, 17 (2003). In 1955, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), founded in 1951 but 
with roots in an organization established in 1915, began acquiring land for 
conservation purposes. See Our History, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/history/index.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K3QR-YCSS (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). The precise origins of 
the modern environmental movement cannot be pinpointed. The publication of 
Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring (1962) brought the message to a broader 
segment of the public. The first Earth Day in 1970 represented the first 
manifestation of environmentalism as a large-scale public movement. For a 
history of environmentalism, see generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE 
SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT (2nd ed. 2005).  
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religious and belief systems. Environmentalism generally values 
land in its natural state and seeks to preserve it from development.2 
Conservation easements, authorized by states over the past 35 
years, are a major vehicle to effectuate this new conservation 
value. Conservation easements allow nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) and governmental entities to preserve land by preventing 
its owner from altering its natural, environmental, and ecological 
features.  
Simultaneous with the widespread rise of environmentalism 
and conservation easements, is an increased drive to find new 
energy sources. One strain of this search operates within the 
traditional model of full development of land resources and 
focuses upon extraction of carbon-based fuels (oil and natural gas). 
Proponents of new domestic exploration argue that domestic 
exploration is necessary to meet consumer demand and to enhance 
America’s geopolitical position by decreasing reliance on foreign 
oil imports.3 Because of new advances over the past ten years, 
exploration companies can now economically extract gas and oil 
from shale formations in new areas of the United States using a 
process that combines new horizontal drilling techniques with 
traditional hydraulic fracturing.4 (For convenience, and consistent 
with conventional usage, this Article will use the terms “fracking” 
and “hydrofracking” to refer to this combination of horizontal 
drilling with hydraulic fracturing technology.) Fracking increases 
gas and oil development, but also raises concerns about its effect 
on the environment.  
A second category of new energy initiatives seeks to develop 
renewable energy sources. These innovations are predicated on a 
view that runs counter to the traditional full development model of 
                                                                                                             
 2. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 
(4th ed. 2001). There sometimes are competing environmental visions. See, e.g., 
Lisa W. Foderaro, As Adirondack Reserve Grows, Asking How Wild It Should 
Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013, at A27 (describing differing views of 
environmentalist, recreationalists, government agencies, and others on how 
forest preserve should be used). 
 3. See Bryan Walsh, America’s Oil Boom Won’t Make It Energy-
Independent from Middle East Madness, TIME (Sept. 5, 2013), http://science 
.time.com/2013/09/05/americas-oil-boom-wont-make-it-energy-independent-
from-mideast-madness/, archived at http://perma.cc/D92R-RCCT; Patti Domm, 
US Is on Fast Track to Energy Independence: Study, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2013, 
2:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100450133, archived at http://perma.cc 
/JGQ6-944R. 
 4. See Tomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2013); Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some 
Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1337, 1338–40 
(2013).  
2014] CONSERVATION EASEMENTS & NEW ENERGIES 103 
 
 
 
land use and include wind turbines, solar fields, and other solar 
devices. Renewable energy generation seeks to provide power 
without utilizing finite earth resources (such as carbon-based 
substances) or increasing the carbon footprint. Renewables also 
aim to minimize their effect on the surrounding ecosystem––
although there are some minor spillovers as described below. 
Overall, the development of wind and solar energy represents a 
concern about the sustainability of the environment and a different 
outlook than traditional full exploitation of land resources. (For 
convenience this Article will refer to fracking, wind, and solar 
energy collectively “new energy” or “new energies,” and to wind 
and solar collectively as “renewables.”) 
This Article examines the intersection of these two major 
trends—the growth of conservation easements and the 
development of new energies—and whether they can be 
compatible under current law.5 Recent conflicts include cases 
involving fracking on conservation easement land,6 differing views 
among conservation organizations about drilling on easement 
property,7 and community debate about siting wind turbines on 
easement land.8 With the increase in both conservation easements 
and new energy trends, these conflicts are likely to grow. 
Specifically, this Article explores whether new energy creation can 
take place on a property that is subject to a conservation easement 
in light of the parties’ express agreement and argues for specific 
interpretative devices that will best find the parties’ intention while 
respecting public policy considerations when that intention is not 
made clear in the writing. This Article also analyzes the effect of 
the Internal Revenue Code on conservation easement development 
and how federal deductibility has driven the structuring of 
                                                                                                             
 5. There are other occasions where visions over conservation easement 
land have conflicted. See Gregg MacDonald, Salona Task Force Will Meet, 
WASH. POST, June 9, 2001, at T16 (describing public process to determine 
appropriate uses of land under governmental conservation easements, 
specifically whether ballfields should be permitted or land retained in a more 
natural state). William H. Whyte, Jr., an early proponent of NPO conservation 
easements, raised concerns about “muted class and economic conflicts,” with 
easement donors being the “gentry” with an interest in the natural countryside 
not in open space with public access for parks and playgrounds. William H. 
Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America, 36 URB. LAND INST.: 
TECHNICAL BULL, 36–37, (1959). 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. See David Giller, Note, Implied Preemption And Its Effect On Local 
Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 631, 637–38 (2013).  
 8. See Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots, 
SUN J. Dec. 1, 2009 (reporting on town meeting to discuss rescinding town’s 
conservation easement so that six wind towers could be built). 
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transactions and state policy goals. This Article then examines 
whether, in order to permit new energy development, a 
conservation easement can subsequently be amended by the fee 
owner and easement holder, and who must participate in this 
process. This Article suggests that the rules concerning 
modification and termination need to be clarified. The current 
confusion frustrates environmentally-rational decisions and the 
vindication of other public policies. Finally, this Article explores 
non-consensual alterations to conservation easements—by judicial 
action or eminent domain proceedings—that would permit new 
energy activities on the land and concludes that they are of limited 
application.  
This Article examines the issue of conservation easements and 
new energies by juxtaposing “environmentally friendly” renewables 
and “environmentally threatening” fracking in order to force a 
deeper inquiry into the question. If only renewables were considered 
as examples, some pro-environment advocates may be willing to 
relax enforcement of the conservation easement because “green” 
purposes are being served. Similarly, if this Article only examined 
scenarios involving non-renewable energies, some proponents of 
increased exploitation of carbon fuels could be biased towards non-
enforcement of the easement. By providing these counter 
examples, however, the discussion can peel away rote reactions. 
Consequently, there can be a more neutral analysis that examines 
the intent of the parties to the easement, provides a sophisticated 
exploration of the relative property rights, suggests a realistic legal 
architecture to respond to evolving conditions, and vindicates the 
public’s interest.  
I. OVERVIEW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND NEW ENERGIES 
A conservation easement is a restriction on land that prevents 
current and successor owners from disturbing the property’s 
natural, ecological, open, or scenic features.9 A typical easement 
                                                                                                             
 9. Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981). See 
generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO PRESERVATION 
OF OPEN LAND (1967); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation 
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and 
Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984) [hereinafter Korngold, Conservation 
Servitudes]; Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private 
Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the 
Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039 [hereinafter Korngold, 
Contentious Issues]; Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements: 
A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and 
Democracy, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 467 (2013) [hereinafter Korngold, 
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document contains a general promise not to interfere with these 
natural attributes, along with specific prohibitions such as bans on 
additional structures, removal of natural growth and timber, and 
installation of roads.10 Conservation easements do not usually 
provide for access by the public.11  
Conservation easements are authorized by statute in all 
American jurisdictions. These statutes are often enacted to address 
questions concerning the validity of conservation restrictions under 
the common law.12 Although there are some jurisdictional 
differences, conservation easements usually share common 
features. Easements may be held only by governmental units or 
qualified NPOs; they are typically held “in gross”—the easement 
holder does not need to own nearby land directly benefitted by the 
easement; they usually are perpetual and are required to have 
unlimited duration in order to be deductible under the Internal 
Revenue Code; conservation easements are enforceable “in rem” 
as property interests; and they bind successor owners of the 
burdened land.13  
A. Conservation Easement Data 
There is a scarcity of data about the number, acreage, holders, 
and location of conservation easements held by both NPOs and 
governments. This has complicated policy assessment and 
                                                                                                             
 
Governmental Conservation Easements]; Gerald Korngold, Globalizing 
Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International 
Environmental Protection, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 585 (2011) [hereinafter Korngold, 
Globalizing Easements]; Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational 
Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal 
Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1525-27 (2007) 
[hereinafter Korngold, Future Generations]; James Boyd et al., The Law and 
Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement 
Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2000); Zachary Bray, Reconciling 
Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation 
Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010); Jessica E. Jay, When 
Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, 
and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (2012); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of 
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005). 
 10. Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at 
469–70. 
 11. Id. at 470 n.6. A limited right of access for the purpose of inspection to 
determine compliance may be granted to the easement holder. 
 12. Id. at 470–71. 
 13. Id. at 471.  
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decisions on easement costs and benefits.14 Some data can be 
found in the Land Trust Alliance’s censuses of land trusts (a 
voluntary survey) and in the Form 990s filed by NPOs under the 
Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, in 2011 a consortium of NPOs 
and federal agencies launched the National Conservation Easement 
Database to gather, on a voluntary basis, information about 
conservation easements.15 Table 1 sets out data derived from these 
sources. This is only an incomplete picture, as some of the 
reporting is voluntary and does not include all NPOs and 
governmental units that may be holding conservation easements.16 
 
Easements Held by 
Government (2013) 
Count Acres 
Federal 24,480 4,958,436 
State 30,202 6,231,606 
Local 13,803 1,071,668 
Regional 65 3,993 
Total 68,550 12,265,703 
Easements Held by State and 
Local Land Trusts (2010) 
Count Acres 
Total  8,833,368 
Easements Held by The 
Nature Conservancy (2012) 
Count Acres 
Total 2367 2,888,283 
Grand Total  23,987,354 
Table 1. Number and acreage of conservation easements held by governmental entities, 
(as of 2013), state and local land trusts (as of 2010), and The Nature Conservancy (as of 
2012).17 
                                                                                                             
 14. See id. at 475–76. 
 15. See What is the NCED?, NAT’L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, 
http://nced.conservationregistry.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/5PJ9-D44Y 
(last updated June 2014).  
 16. I have argued for increased legislative action to increase data collection. 
Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1070.  
 17. See What is the NCED?, supra note 15 (for government easements); 
2010 Land Trust Census, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 6 (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/2010-final-report, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9SX9-MWT8 (for land trusts); See The Native 
2014] CONSERVATION EASEMENTS & NEW ENERGIES 107 
 
 
 
The data show that there has been tremendous and continued 
growth in the number of conservation easements over the years. 
The number of acres under conservation easement reported by 
members of the Land Trust Alliance grew from several thousand in 
1985 to 8.8 million in 2010.18  
B. The Policy Calculus of Conservation Easements 
There are various policy reasons supporting the validity and 
enforcement of conservation easements. Conservation easements 
allow landowners to exchange their development rights with 
easement buyers in return for cash or tax advantages, thus 
benefitting both parties.19 Future purchasers of the burdened land, 
taking with notice of the easement, can adjust their bargaining 
based on the restriction and should be presumed to consent to the 
existing easement rights.20  
These consensual, market-based transactions can increase the 
efficient allocation of our limited land resources. Landowners can 
liquidate property rights they no longer wish to retain; NPOs or 
governments can conserve a piece of property by merely obtaining 
an easement instead of overinvesting resources in obtaining a fee 
interest that they do not actually need to achieve preservation.  
Moreover, creation of conservation easements is consistent 
with the concept that people may freely dispose of their property 
by virtue of freedom of contract and property rights.21 Holders of 
land are entitled to seek personal satisfaction by exercising free 
choice with respect to the land. Thus, the decision to convey a 
conservation easement should be respected. The law should 
intervene in such consensual arrangements only in the most 
unusual situations.  
Conservation easements acquired by NPOs represent private 
rather than governmental initiatives.22 By virtue of being private 
action, NPO ownership shifts the cost of acquisition, monitoring, 
stewardship, and enforcement from the government to private 
resources.  
                                                                                                             
 
Conservancy, 2012 Form 990, Schedule D, available at http://tinyurl.com 
/mtg44b4, archived at http://perma.cc/BM2Q-3J7V (NCED and LTA data are 
self-reported and may cause an undercount total conservation easements and 
acreage). 
 18. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 17, at 6.  
 19. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1056.  
 20. Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note 9, at 448–49. 
 21. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1056. 
 22. Id. at 1055.  
108 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
Governmental conservation easements have their own 
advantages. When conservation easements are purchased by the 
government, conservation is advanced through consent of the 
owner rather than by the coercive means of governmental 
regulation.23 
The legislative validation of conservation easements reflects a 
new American perspective towards land, which favors a balancing 
of development against preservation values.24 Conservation 
easements can bring increased social and economic value. 
Conservation easements are praised for providing beautiful vistas, 
species protection, atmospheric remediation, carbon dioxide 
reduction, watershed preservation, and psychic gains.25 Proponents 
assert economic gains also, including protection of ecological 
capital for future generations, preservation of farmland for food 
sources, and quality of life enhancement necessary to attract and 
retain skilled labor.26 Conservation easements may also increase 
the values of nearby land.27 Yet the conservation easement 
phenomenon is more than the sum of its various benefits, as it 
reflects a new American ethos favoring land preservation.28 
                                                                                                             
 23. See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at 
477–78. 
 24. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1054–55. 
 25. See VIRGINIA MCCONNELL & MARGARET WALLS, THE VALUE OF OPEN 
SPACE: EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES OF NONMARKET BENEFITS 48 (2005); LILLY 
SHOUP & REID EWING, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE, RECREATION 
FACILITIES AND WALKABLE COMMUNITY DESIGN, ACTIVE LIVING RES. 17 
(2010), available at http://atfiles.org/files/pdf/Economic-Benefits-Active.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BHK7-3G8A.  
 26. See Rand Wentworth, Economic Benefits of Open Space Protection, 
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE (2003), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation 
/documents/economic-benefits.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V5X-4E8P; John 
L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the 
Empirical Evidence, 33 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 1 (2001); GREEN SPACE 
ALLIANCE, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PROTECTED OPEN SPACE IN 
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (Jan. 2011), available at http://economyleague 
.org/files/Protected_Open_Space_SEPA_2-11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc 
/F7DS-V7XM.  
 27. Jacqueline Geoghegan, The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land 
Use, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 91 (2002).  
 28. See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law and Society: The 
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 91–
94 (2001); D.T. Kuzmiak, The American Environmental Movement, 157 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 265, 265 (1991).  
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C. The New Energies 
The costs and benefits of the new energies and the ensuing 
public policy choices present important questions, fraught with 
conflicting scientific, economic, moral, and political views.29 
These conflicting views continually change as new studies are 
released and debated.30 A detailed examination of these competing 
arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. What needs to be 
understood for this Article is that each of the new energies pose 
environmental costs (but to significantly varying degrees) that 
could threaten the preservation goals of a conservation easement. 
Moreover, while there is legislative and judicial support for 
renewables, there are concerns advanced in case law about their 
intrusion on neighboring landowners.31 These factors add a twist to 
the resolution of conflicts between new energy development and 
conservation easements.  
1. Fracking  
Briefly, modern fracking techniques marry traditional 
hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling, which results in a 
technologically feasible method for the removal of previously 
                                                                                                             
 29. Some have focused on governmental regulation of fracking, see, e.g., 
Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 361, 382–84 (2012), while others have maintained that common law remedies 
might suffice, see Merrill, supra note 4, at 989. For other discussion of fracking, 
see Adam Garmezy, Note, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing’s Environmental 
And Economic Impacts: The Need For A Comprehensive Federal Baseline And 
the Provision Of Local Rights, 23 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 405, 406 (2013); 
James Kirkup, Church of England In ‘Fracking Land-Grab, THE TELEGRAPH 
(Aug. 15, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10245697 
/Church-of-England-in-fracking-land-grab.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/EG8H-TXLS (reporting on conflict created by the Church’s failure to rule out 
fracking under its lands); Fred Siegel, Fracking, Poverty and the New Liberal 
Gentry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2013, at A15; Michele Wines, Colorado Cities’ 
Rejection of Fracking Poses Political Test for Natural Gas Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2013, at A14; Stephen Castle, European Union Proposes Easing 
of Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A1 (EU decided against 
proposing laws regulating environmental damage from fracking).  
 30. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Gas Leaks in Fracking Disputed in Study, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, at A12 (reporting on peer-reviewed study sponsored 
by Environmental Defense Fund and nine petroleum companies that found 
fracking releases less methane than previously thought and that shale gas is 
cleaner than coal); Brian Resnick, Can Fracking Cause Earthquakes?, THE NAT’L 
J. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/can-fracking-cause-
earthquakes-20130905, archived at http://perma.cc/S298-CDCD (reporting on 
study making that conclusion).  
31 Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 434 (Nev. 2013). 
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unreachable gas and oil from shale rock. Traditional hydraulic 
fracturing has been utilized for some 60 years and involves vertical 
drilling into shale formations and injecting large volumes of water 
mixed with sand or rocks and chemicals.32 The water mixture 
breaks up the shale and releases previously trapped oil and gas. 
Over recent years, technological innovations have made horizontal 
fracturing possible, where the drill is sent down vertically, turned 
on an angle, and fluids injected into the shale.33 This advance has 
made fracking financially profitable in new regions of the country 
and has opened up areas such as in Pennsylvania and New York to 
this process.34 The Marcellus Shale deposit, lying under parts of 
New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, 
Maryland, and Tennessee, contains approximately 141 trillion 
cubic feet of “technically recoverable” natural gas according to the 
United States Department of Energy in 2012, with the total United 
States shale-based natural gas being 482 trillion cubic feet.35  
Except in the most unusual situations, removal of oil and gas 
by fracking on conservation easement land presents ecological 
risks to the property. These potential risks include: excessive water 
usage in the fracking process; contamination of groundwater, on 
the parce itself and in aquifers under other land; disruption of the 
surface and habitat due to installation of the drillpad, other 
equipment, and roads; noise; harmful gas emissions affecting air 
quality; and claims that reinjection of waste water causes 
earthquakes.36 The degree of environmental damage will likely be 
                                                                                                             
 32. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 971–72; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 1338–
40; State of N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185–
86 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Rachel Heron, Justin S. DuClos & Shaun A. Goho, The 
Interpretation of Surface Easements in Severance Deeds As A Limit On 
Hydraulic Fracturing Practices, 19 BUFF. ENVT’L L.J. 73, 78–79 (2012); 
Garmezy, supra note 29, at 406–07. 
 33. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 971–72; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 1338–
40.  
 34. See David Giller, Note, Implied Preemption And Its Effect On Local 
Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 631, 637–38 (2013). 
 35. AEO2012 Early Release Overview, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/4ZRQ-7A2B (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). To provide a sense of scale, in 
2012, the total U.S. consumption of natural gas was approximately 25 million 
cubic feet. Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/5KY4-DLGU (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). See also Joshua M. Tallent, 
Comment, I Drink Your Milkshake? Potential Property Rights Repercussions of 
natural Gas Exploration in New York State, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 413, 414 (2013).  
 36. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 185–86 
(describing water pollution); Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement On The Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, N.Y. ST. 
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greater when the drilling rig is placed on the conservation land 
itself, thus creating direct surface and related risks. When oil and 
gas are removed from under conservation land by horizontal 
drilling from a rig on a neighboring unrestricted parcel, there may 
be limited surface damage on the conserved land, but there is still a 
potential threat to ground water as well as risks due to noise, gas 
emissions, and other fallout. There have been reports of differences 
among conservation organizations as to whether they will permit 
gas drilling on property on which they hold easements, with some 
barring all drilling, others permitting horizontal drilling from other 
properties, and some apparently allowing drilling, as well as 
related structures and roads, on the conserved property itself.37 
2. Renewables 
Various legislatures have enacted statutes and courts have 
decided cases based on a public policy favoring renewables.38 These 
range from state zoning enabling acts that require facilitating wind 
and solar access when possible in local ordinances,39 to California’s 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which sets state goals to 
create renewable energy,40 to general state policies to develop and 
utilize renewable energy,41 to tax incentives to install renewable 
energy devices.42 Use of renewable energy sources has increased. 
                                                                                                             
 
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn 
/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UU9G-EW2F; Giller, supra 
note 34, at 638; Thomas Hooker, Note, Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority 
Under New York State’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 869, 870–71 (2012); Rachel Rawlins, Planning for Fracking on the Barnett 
Shale: Urban Air Pollution, Improving Health Based Regulation, and the Role 
of Local Governments, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 226, 233–35 (2013); Resnick, supra 
note 30 (reporting on study making that conclusion); Henry Fountain, Experts 
Eye Oil and Gas Industry as Quakes Shake Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2013, at A20; Henry Fountain, Ohio Looks at Whether Fracking Led to 2 
Quakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A20 (reporting on commencement of 
state department of natural resources investigation).  
 37. Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, 
Conservation Easements, and Drilling In The Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 136, 143–44 (2013).  
 38. See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of statutes protecting solar devices 
against homeowner association restrictions.  
 39. See, e.g., Wood v. City of Madison, 659 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Wis. 2003) 
(quoting WIS. STAT. § 236.01).  
 40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 (West Supp. 2014). 
 41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a–35k (2008).  
 42. See Jeffrey D. Moss, Solar Panels, Tax Incentives, and Your House, 
PROBATE & PROP. MAGAZINE 17 (Jan./Feb. 2010).  
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As of 2011, 13 % of the United States’s electricity generation was 
from renewable sources, primarily solar.43 
Although these renewable goals and programs bring 
environmental benefits, they are sometimes challenged for creating 
negative environmental effects. For example, wind turbines are 
sometimes opposed by neighboring landowners, local governments, 
and others for interfering with habitats, dislocating wildlife, marring 
vistas, generating noise, killing of local and migrating birds, and 
creating “shadow flicker.”44 At least one court has found that a 
residential wind turbine created an enjoinable nuisance because of 
aesthetic, noise, shadow flicker, and property value concerns.45 
There have also been challenges of the siting of solar fields based 
on environmental impacts.46 
These issues played out in an analogous land dispute reported in 
2009.47 Woody Companies sought to lease federal land in the 
Mojave Desert to build wind farms and major solar plants. Much to 
the dismay of environmentalists seeking to promote such alternative 
energy sources, Senator Diane Feinstein introduced legislation to 
bar wind farms and solar plants on one million acres of the Mojave 
because of concerns from local citizens that such projects would 
destroy scenery and natural land features. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. 
was quoted in the New York Times saying that “this is arguably the 
best solar land in the world, and Senator Feinstein shouldn’t be 
                                                                                                             
 43. AEO2014 Early Release Overview, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 5 (Apr. 
2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U3T7-WM7S. 
 44. See Fairwindct, Inc. v. Conn. Siting Council, 2012 WL 5201354 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2012); GPH Cohasset LLC v. Trustees of Reservations, 2013 WL 
3022390 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 60 A.3d 
654 (Vt. 2012). See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Koch Brother Wages 12-Year 
Fight Over Wind Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A12; Peter Schworm & 
David Filipoy, Flickering Shadows From Wind Turbines Draw Complaints, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04 
/04/turbine-flicker-effect-draws-complaints/UKgf7nOwMHm8CWAtZ47V5L 
/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YR3M-ZWNE. (explaining shadow 
flicker); Dan Frosch, A Struggle to Balance Wind Energy with Wildlife, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2013, at A18 (explaining bird kills); Diane Cardwell, U.S. 
Offshore Wind Farm, Made in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, at B1 
(explaining interference with view).  
 45. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 434 (Nev. 2013).  
 46. See generally Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (upholding the solar power development 
plan).  
 47. Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, December 21, 
2009, at B1. 
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allowed to take this land off the table without a proper and 
scientific environmental review.”48  
3. Achieving a Balance 
New energies present complex scientific, economic, and policy 
perspectives. There may be differences between environmentalists 
focusing on preservation of land and species as the paramount 
value and those emphasizing carbon reduction. Finally, the issues 
get thornier when environmental values are juxtaposed with energy 
security and economic development resulting from oil and gas 
exploitation that benefits financially distressed areas. These 
competing factors require a balancing of the goals of conservation 
easements and new energy development.  
A. Conservation Easement Tax Policy and New Energies 
Some conservation easements are purchased for consideration 
by governments or NPOs. In many situations, however, owners 
donate conservation easements to these entities. While these 
donors apparently are motivated by philanthropic intentions, the 
donation of a qualified conservation easement may also provide 
significant federal, state, and local tax benefits to the donor. These 
benefits represent a significant tax subsidy to the public for 
conservation easement creation.  
1. Federal  
Under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the 
donor of a conservation easement to an NPO, federal, state, or 
political subdivision may receive a federal income tax deduction.49 
Deductions are allowed only for a conservation easement “granted 
in perpetuity,”50 which explains why donated easements in the 
various states are almost always of perpetual duration. It is 
estimated that between 2002 and 2007, these deductions resulted in 
$3.6 billion of lost tax revenue.51 The donation of a conservation 
easement also serves to reduce the value of the property for federal 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id.  
 49. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c),(h) (2012).  
 50. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2). 
 51. Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Tax Expenditure: In Search of 
Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9–10 (2012).  
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estate tax purposes, causing additional potential revenue losses for 
the federal government.52  
The indirect expenditure for conservation easements, notably 
through the income tax deduction, raises various policy questions. 
One issue outside the scope of this Article is whether the 
government should subsidize any donor activity, and if so, to what 
extent. A second level of inquiry, similarly outside the ambit of 
this Article, is whether the investment in preserved open space 
without public access is preferable to open space outlays that 
provide access, such as playgrounds in urban areas.53  
The question at hand is whether the provisions of the IRC and 
accompanying Regulations further the articulated congressional 
goal of protecting open space for the scenic enjoyment of the 
public and habitat preservation. Under the IRC, a donation will 
qualify for a deduction where its purpose is “preservation of open 
space” that is “(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or 
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State or local 
governmental conservation policy, and will yield significant public 
benefit.”54 The first clause raises multiple questions. What does 
“scenic enjoyment of the public” mean? Will there be a deduction 
for the donation of a 100-acre tract where only 2 acres are visible 
to the public from a roadway? Does the view have to be 
environmentally or aesthetically special to give “enjoyment”? 
Does a random half-acre parcel in a crowded urban area provide 
more or less scenic enjoyment than 100 acres in wilderness area? 
The IRS Regulations attempt to provide guidance to determine 
“scenic enjoyment.”55 They state:  
Preservation of land may be for the scenic enjoyment of the 
general public if development of the property would impair 
the scenic character of the local rural or urban landscape or 
would interfere with a scenic panorama that can be enjoyed 
from a park, nature preserve, road, waterbody, trail, or 
historic structure or land area, and such area or 
transportation way is open to, or utilized by, the public.56  
                                                                                                             
 52. 26 C.F.R. §25.2703-1(a)(4) (2014). Additionally, the IRC permits 
postmortem donations of conservation easements by the estate, further lowering 
the property’s value for estate tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2031(c), 2055(f).  
 53. See Korngold,Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1060–61.  
 54. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A). See RP Golf, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 
2012-282 (T.C. 2012) (rejecting claim of a clearly delineated governmental open 
space policy on the facts).  
 55. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(h)(4)(d)(4)(ii). 
 56. Id. 
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The Regulations then provide eight factors, most of which lack 
clarity and are subject to debate.  
Unclear scenic easement criteria present the opportunity for 
abuses of deductions and wasting of funds that Congress intended 
to support bona fide conservation easement efforts. The public 
interest might be better served if scenic easements were deductible 
only when there was a local, state, or federal governmental 
certification that the easement serves a public conservation 
purpose.57 The IRC already permits the validation of a scenic 
easement with such governmental action; this could be required for 
all scenic easements.58 This formulation might improve the process 
for conservation easement creation and help to ensure that public 
resources are well spent. There are costs, but arguably they are 
outweighed by the benefits: as donors will have to get government 
approvals, transaction costs and time delays will increase. 
Bureaucracy could grow. Some owners may be dissuaded from 
making contributions because of increased red tape. One data point 
may provide comfort, however: Massachusetts currently requires 
local and state governments to approve all conservation easements 
as a condition to creation, unrelated to federal tax deductibility 
issues.59 Nevertheless, Massachusetts has an active conservation 
easement culture, with the second highest number of land trusts in 
the country.60  
2. New Energies and Federal Deductions  
The IRC and Regulations may limit deductibility for 
conservation easements where energy development takes place on 
the preserved land. First, the IRC addresses some situations where 
subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals and the right to access such 
minerals are not included in the gift.61 When such mineral rights 
are retained, the donation of a conservation easement will not be 
                                                                                                             
 57. I have suggested in earlier work that the public interest might be better 
served if scenic easements were deductible only if there were a local, state, or 
federal governmental certification that the easement serves a public conservation 
purpose. Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1068. 
 58. Id. My suggestion would align scenic easements with historical 
easements. The latter are deductible only if the land is listed in the National 
Register or included in a registered historic district and certified by the Secretary 
of the Interior as being of historic significance. 
 59. MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (2014). Massachusetts is the only 
state requiring governmental approval of all conservation easements.  
 60. 2010 National Land Trust Census Report, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 17 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census 
/data-tables, archived at http://perma.cc/J26K-Y973.  
 61. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(6) (2012).  
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considered exclusively for conservation purposes and thus not 
deductible “if at any time there may be extraction or removal of 
minerals by any surface mining method.”62 Because of this 
provision, some lawyers counsel clients seeking conservation 
easement deductions to specifically prohibit surface mining in the 
easement document.63 Thus, the federal deduction affects the 
structuring of conservation easement transactions and possibly state 
policy goals.  
Although surface mining is barred, the Regulations 
contemplate other extraction activities on conservation easement 
land that will not interfere with deductibility. The Regulations state 
that a deduction will be permitted 
in the case of certain methods of mining that may have 
limited, localized impact on the real property but that are 
not irremediably destructive of significant conservation 
interests. For example, a deduction will not be denied in a 
case where production facilities are concealed or 
compatible with existing topography and landscape and 
when surface alteration is to be restored to its original 
state.64 
It is unclear, however, whether a fracking operation could fit 
within this illustration. The potential adverse environmental effects 
on the conserved parcel itself––the building and the installation of 
the drill pad and related infrastructure, building of roads, 
disturbance of habitat, use of substantial water resources, and 
possible pollution of water––may fail the “not irremediably 
destructive of significant conservation interests” test. Moreover, 
the possible negative ecological spillovers of fracking on adjacent 
land, such as possible exhaustion and pollution of aquifers, may 
also prevent the easement from achieving “conservation purposes,” 
which is the predicate for receiving a deduction.65 Determining 
these issues would require a factual examination of the nature of 
any given operation, the particular parcel, and the effects on the 
                                                                                                             
 62. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(B)(i). Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. United States, 
38 Fed. Cl. 645, 658 (Fed. Cl. 1997).  
 63. See William M. Silberstein, Pitfalls Galore: Mineral Development and 
Conservation Easement Tax Law 414, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION EASEMENTS AND 
COMMUNITY STEWARDSHIP ENTITIES, PRINCIPLES, DRAFTING PRACTICES, AND 
PRACTICAL REALITIES (2008), SN055 ALI-ABA (Westlaw); Glass v. Comm’r, 
471 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2006) (referring to prohibition on mining activities 
in conservation easement).  
 64. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g) (2008), Example 1.  
 65. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).  
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land and surroundings. Slant drilling from another parcel, however, 
may present less environmental impacts but may still be too 
significant to allow deductibility.  
3. State and Local Tax Subsidies 
The creation of a conservation easement can also cause a 
reduction in state and local tax revenues. Many states provide 
income tax incentives for the donation of conservation easements 
through deductions66 or income tax credits.67 Additionally, the 
restrictions of a conservation easement reduce the assessed value 
of the property, thus decreasing property tax revenues for the state 
and local government.68 The decline in tax revenues leaves 
municipalities with the prospect of lowering services or raising 
taxes on other taxpayers to close the gap.  
While federal and state law offer tax incentives for the creation 
of conservation easements, the IRC may deny income tax 
deductions if fracking takes place under certain conditions. The 
risk of the loss of the deduction may lead a donor/fee owner to 
require a ban on all fracking activities in the easement document.  
II. TERMS OF THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
Under contract theory, the conservation easement agreement 
should control whether the fee owner or the fee owner’s transferee 
                                                                                                             
 66. See Jeffrey O. Sundberg & Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects 
of Conservation Easements, (Lincoln Institute of Land Pol’y, Working Paper 
WP06JS1, 2006), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1128_Sund 
berg_complete_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LV32-LNNC (noting that 
the deduction is usually not provided by a specific state tax legislation but by the 
state’s general tracking of the federal tax code and its deductions). 
 67. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (Consol. 2014); N.C. GEN STAT. § 
105-151.12 (2014). Colorado lost $85.1 million in revenue through easement 
credits in 2005, up from $2.3 million in 2001 (though the Colorado program has 
since been changed). K.C. Mason, Lawmakers Want to Tighten Controls on 
Credit for Donated Land, 44 STATE TAX NOTES 146 (2007).  
 68. See, e.g., Jet Black, LLC v. Routt Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 165 
P.3d 744 (Colo. App. 2006); Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005); McKee v. Dep’t of Rev. & Lincoln Cnty. Assessor, 2004 WL 
2340265 (Or. Tax Ct. 2004). See also Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing 
Land: Open Space and Conservation Easements, 41 STATE TAX NOTES 747, 
747–62 (2006) (questioning the hypothesis that increased values of surrounding 
land due to the open space offsets the revenue loss); Jeffrey O. Sundberg, Tax 
Incentives for Open Space Preservation: Examining the Costs and Benefits of 
Preferential Assessment, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY 14 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2324_1664_Tax_Incentives_for_Open_Spa
ce_1013LL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/65E2-D48J.  
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can engage in new energy development activities—solar, wind, 
fracking—on the land. In an ideal transactional world, this is a 
matter that the parties (or their lawyers) considered, negotiated, 
agreed upon, and reduced to clear, comprehensible language. In a 
good situation, the parties would have contemplated not just issues 
apparent in the present day but also would have carefully 
anticipated potential future scenarios that could arise.  
Too often, however, parties fail to discuss essential issues and 
align expectations, reduce their understanding to a clear writing, or 
imagine what the future might look like. Furthermore, even the 
most prescient parties and counsel are unable to predict coming 
technological and related economic changes that would shift the 
parties’ views of the deal, such as the combining of horizontal 
drilling with hydrofracking. In such situations, differences may 
ultimately arise when one party seeks to take a course of action 
that the other believes is (or is not) permitted under the terms of 
the writing. In such cases, courts will have to decide disputes as to 
the meaning and extent of the understanding.  
Because both conservation easements and emerging energy 
practices are relatively new and continue to evolve, there are only a 
few cases involving conflicts between these interests.69 This 
section will isolate these two variables in several ways. First, it 
will examine the rich body of law on interpretation of land 
restrictions in general and the ways that courts have and should 
approach disputes between the fee owner and the holder of a lesser 
                                                                                                             
 69. This examination assumes that the conservation easement has priority in 
the property over the fee owner and over any third party holding a right to 
extract oil and gas or erect solar devices and wind turbines. In this scenario, the 
fee owner would have created the conservation easement and then either 
retained all remaining rights or granted an extraction right to another, e.g. an oil 
or alternative energy company. Assuming that the third party took with notice of 
the conservation easement, the third party is bound by the conservation 
easement and subordinate to it. See GERALD KORNGOLD & PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND TRANSFER, 
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 269–86 (5th. ed. 2009); ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN 
B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH: CONSERVATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST 147 (2004) (stating in clause C. of model deed of conservation 
easement that mineral rights owned by landowner are governed by the 
easement). If, however, the extraction right of the third party was created prior 
to the conservation easement, the NPO or government holders’ conservation 
rights are junior (again assuming notice). Provisions in the easement that 
conflict with the prior interest will, therefore, not be binding. See generally 
Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation 
Easements, And Drilling In The Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136 (2013) 
(suggesting use of the accommodation doctrine to protect properties where 
mineral rights were severed prior to the placement of the conservation easement 
on the property). 
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interest (typically an easement or covenant). It will then analyze 
general conservation easement cases (i.e., not dealing with new 
energies) to see how courts have applied traditional construction 
tools to these relatively new interests. The section will then explore 
how cases have decided attempts by lot owners to develop oil, gas, 
solar, and wind resources in the face of homeowner association 
restrictions. Finally, this section will bring this analysis to bear in 
the two recent cases that actually address a conflict between 
fracking and an existing conservation easement and suggests how 
parties, drafters, and courts might deal with such matters in the 
future.  
A. Constructional Norms for Private Land Use Agreements 
The norms controlling the interpretation of private land use 
agreements—covenants and easements—provide insights into how 
conservation easements will be construed and applied by courts. 
Ultimately, these interpretational rules will be important in 
determining if a given conservation easement permits new energy 
development.  
As will be discussed in this section, despite the use of the term 
“easement,” conservation easements are not traditional easements. 
Rather, they are like covenants, which are negative in nature and 
establish restrictions on property. Thus, the body of law 
interpreting covenants should be used to construe conservation 
easements.70 The polestar in interpreting conservation easements 
under the “covenant” rubric should be the intent expressed in the 
instrument. The result is the same for those who insist that 
conservation easements should be interpreted like other “true 
easements” since, as will also be developed below, the intention of 
the parties determines the extent of an easement. Both easements 
and covenants are consensual land use arrangements and it is 
logical and desirable that the extent of these rights should be 
controlled by the parties’ intent.  
1. Interpreting Covenants 
Courts often hedge, however, about giving unfettered 
dominance to the parties’ intent when construing covenants. The 
traditional conflict between freedom of contract and concerns over 
restrictions of land reverberates in the statements, if not actions, of 
courts interpreting covenants. 
                                                                                                             
 70. Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 2 describes creation, transfer, and 
other aspects of conservation easements but is silent on interpretation doctrines.  
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a. Should Intent Control?  
Some courts state that covenants should be enforced “like other 
contracts.”71 They announce that they will give effect to the 
parties’ clearly expressed intent72 since public policy “favors the 
fullest liberty of contract and widest latitude possible on the 
disposition of one’s property.”73 Conversely, some courts continue 
to declare that covenants will be strictly construed because they 
limit the free use of property.74 This anti-restrictions bias serves to 
curb the intent of parties in private land use arrangements.  
The anti-restrictions bias in interpretation of covenants has 
been directly rejected, however, by some courts that recognize the 
efficiency benefits of these arrangements. One opinion, for 
example, stated that “under the modern view, building restrictions 
are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the 
public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the 
old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies.”75 Many 
courts try to balance these competing principles by stating that they 
will enforce a covenant as written if its intent is clear, but if it is 
ambiguous, they will strictly construe the instrument and resolve 
doubts in favor of free use of land.76 As one court asserted: 
In order to accommodate the principle favoring free and 
unrestricted use of property and the principle favoring 
individuals’ right to free contract in ordering their own 
affairs, we have generally said that documents such as the 
Community Declaration must be express in unambiguous 
language to be enforceable contracts.77 
                                                                                                             
 71. Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).  
 72. See, e.g., Christian v. Flora, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 2008); 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc., 272 P.3d 491, 500–501 (Idaho 
2012); Knudson v. Trainor, 345 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Neb. 1984).  
 73. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953).  
 74. See, e.g., Orlando Lake Forest Joint Venture v. Lake Forest Master 
Cmty., 105 So. 3d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Davista Holdings, LLC 
v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 741 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Ga. App. 2013); Taddei v. Vill. 
Creek Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 725 S.E.2d 451, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).  
 75. Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Ky. 1958), quoted in Triple 
Crown Subdivision Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138, 140 
(Ky. 2009). Accord Aqua Fria Save the Open Space Ass’n v. Rowe, 255 P.3d 
390, 394-396 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).  
 76. See, e.g., Lamoreux v. Langlotz, 757 P.2d 584, 587 (Ala. 1988); 
Woodglen Estates Ass’n v. Dulaney, 359 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); 
Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners Ass’n v. Vasquez, 300 P.3d 736, 
743 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). 
 77. Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat’l, LLC, 780 N.W.2d 111, 124 (2010).  
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Arguably, courts should downplay concerns over restrictions 
on land when interpreting and enforcing conservation easements. 
The legislation expressly authorizing conservation easements in all 
states demonstrates a public policy favoring these interests. While 
in certain discrete scenarios, perpetual conservation easements may 
raise anti-restriction policy concerns that would be relevant to a 
court interpreting an easement instrument, the intent of the parties 
to such legislatively authorized interests should generally be 
paramount.  
b. Finding the Intent  
The parties’ intent should be the essential inquiry in enforcement 
of conservation easements if the easements are interpreted under the 
covenant rubric. However, finding the parties’ expectations in a 
given covenant is not always an easy proposition. There is a general 
lack of clarity in the manner of expression as well as varying views 
in the states as to the permissible use of extrinsic evidence in 
interpreting a document. These issues are manifest in construing all 
types of contracts.  
In determining the parties’ intent, a threshold consideration is 
whether the court should look solely at the covenant in question or 
whether it should consider extrinsic evidence. There are 
jurisdictional and philosophical differences at work in this question. 
Some courts take a broad approach, indicating that intent should be 
found from both the covenant and circumstances surrounding its 
execution.78 Others, though, are more circumspect in looking 
beyond the language of the instrument itself. These courts declare 
that if the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous, the 
court should not construe the covenant but should enforce the 
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.79 Only if the 
writing is ambiguous is it proper to admit extrinsic evidence.80 
The hard question is determining whether any given language 
is ambiguous. The courts have struggled mightily, and in vain, to 
                                                                                                             
 78. See, e.g., Martin’s Landing Found., Inc. v. Land Lake Assocs., 707 F.2d 
1329, 1333–1334 (11th Cir. 1983); CDR Devs., LLC v. College Hill Heights 
Homeowners , LLC, 973 So. 2d 273, 280 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Gosnay v. Big 
Sky Owners Ass’n, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250 (1983). 
 79. See, e.g., Good v. Bear Canyon Ranch Ass’n, 160 P.3d 251, 253 (Colo. 
App. 2007); 600 N. Frederick Rd., LLC v. Burlington Coat Factory of Md., 
LLC, 19 A.3d 837, 852 (Md. 2011); Fayard v. Design Comm. of Homestead 
Subdivision, 230 P.3d 299, 303 (Wyo. 2010).  
 80. See, e.g., Divizio v. Kewin Enters., 666 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983); Dierberg v. Willis, 700 S.W.2d 461, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Cupola 
Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley, 898 A.2d 134, 139 (Vt. 2006). 
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develop a workable general test and instead have offered circular, 
elastic, unpredictable and contradictory statements.81 The results 
are also difficult to harmonize. For example, one court found that a 
ban on “trucks . . . house trailers . . . and trailers of every 
description” was unambiguous and did not include motor homes,82 
while another held that a prohibition against a “house trailer, 
trailer, coach” was ambiguous leading to a construction barring 
motor homes.83 
Once a covenant is found to be ambiguous, the courts will 
admit various types of extrinsic evidence such as the purpose of 
the covenant and the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the instrument.84 They may also employ constructional canons, 
such as ejusdem generis85 and the “last antecedent rule.”86 
It is not easy, therefore, to find the parties’ intent in all 
covenant situations. The language chosen by the parties may create 
difficulties, and the courts’ interpretation devices and outcomes 
make for unpredictable and contradictory results.  
2. Construing Easements 
Easements have long been respected and valued property 
interests, allowing parties to create efficiency-maximizing private 
arrangements such as right of ways, canals, railways, utility access, 
and pipelines.87 With easements, courts do not express any of the 
ambivalence that they state with covenants, nor do they manifest 
fears that easements will create undesirable restrictions on 
property. As a result, courts enforce express easements based on 
the intent of the parties,88 unencumbered by anti-restriction 
concerns.  
                                                                                                             
 81. For one example, contrast Rusanowski v. Gurule, 840 P.2d 595, 597 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) with Dyegard Land Partnership v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 
300, 309 (Tex. App. 2001).  
 82. Lake St. Louse Cmty. Ass’n v. Ledity, 672 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984).  
 83. Borowski v. Welch, 324 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).  
 84. See, e.g., Strader v. Oaklery, 410 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. App. 1982); 
Birch Tree Partners, LLC v. Windsor Digital Studio, LLC, 945 N.Y.S.2d 162 
(App. Div. 2012); Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Neb. 1988).  
 85. See, e.g., Campbell v. Glacier Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243, 1249–50 (D. 
Idaho 1974).  
 86. See, e.g., Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Elsah Hills Corp., 445 N.E.2d 
1193, 1196 (Ill. App. 1983).  
 87. See Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the 
Law of Property—Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1988).  
 88. See, e.g., Parris Props., LLC v. Nichols, 700 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010), cert denied (2011); City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadow Prof’l Plaza, 
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As with covenants, there are different easement interpretation 
methods employed by the courts, and the range of views is similar 
to those applied with covenants. Traditionally, most courts looked 
solely at the document and the written word to find the parties’ 
intent.89 These courts consider extrinsic evidence only if the 
language is ambiguous.90 Once again, the difficulty is determining 
whether language is indeed ambiguous, and courts have differed 
when interpreting the same language.91 When a document is 
ambiguous, courts have commonly utilized certain types of 
extrinsic evidence, including the circumstances at the time of the 
instrument’s execution, practices of the parties since the 
easement’s creation, direct evidence of the parties’ intent, previous 
judicial constructions of similar language, and a general rule of 
reason.92  
Some courts, and the Third Restatement of Property, 
promulgated in 2000, articulate a less rigid reliance on the words 
of the written instrument and allow for an enhanced role of 
extrinsic evidence in determining intent—apparently without 
drawing a formal line between ambiguous and non-ambiguous 
documents.93 The Third Restatement declares that “intention is 
ascertained from the servitude’s language interpreted in light of all 
the circumstances,”94 apparently allowing such extrinsic evidence 
                                                                                                             
 
LLC, 293 P.3d 860, 865 (Nev. 2013); Borek v. Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson 
Cnty., 785 N.W.2d 615, 625 (Wis. 2010).  
 89. See, e.g., Cobb v. Allen, 460 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Ala. 1984); Borton v. 
Forest Hill Country Club, 926 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); 810 
Properties v. Jump, 170 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). See 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482 (1944).   
 90. See, e.g., Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984); Kwolek v. Swickard, 944 N.E.2d 564, 571-574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); 
Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 964 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Or. 1998).  
 91. For example, compare Deyling v. Flowers, 460 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that “ingress and egress” is unambiguous and allows 
access by pedestrian and auto traffic) with Phillips Industries v. Firkins, 827 
P.2d 706, 711-713 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (holding that “ingress and egress by 
vehicles” was ambiguous requiring resort to extrinsic evidence resulting in 
barring of trucks and requiring 24 hour notice for use of vehicles).  
 92. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: 
EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 126 (2004) 
[hereinafter KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS].  
 93. See, e.g., Hoffman Fuel Co. v. Elliott, 789 A.2d 1149, 1156 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2002); Kovanda v. Vavra, 633 N.W.2d 576, 585 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001); 
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 43 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.1, cmt. d 
(2000).  
 94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, supra note 93. 
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in all cases. This may represent a view that because language so 
often may have multiple, or at least nuanced meanings, it is rare to 
find truly non-ambiguous words. The danger of course is that the 
written, final expression of the parties’ intention may be diluted by 
other factors.  
3. Successor Issues 
Private land use agreements, whether cast as easements or 
covenants, impact not only the original parties but also control the 
subsequent owners of the parcels burdened and benefited by these 
arrangements. A successor owner will be bound by prior interests, 
such as easements and covenants affecting the parcel, if the 
successor had notice of them prior to purchasing the property.95 
Ambiguities in the original easement or covenant will create 
uncertain legal effects for future holders of the land in question.  
When courts determine the intent behind an easement or 
covenant, however, they typically fail to recognize that the true 
parties in interest may no longer be the original owners but rather 
successors. The courts usually attempt to decide what the easement 
or covenant meant to the original transacting parties, as if it were a 
simple bilateral contract interpretation case. This could yield bad 
results. For example, a side discussion or letter between the 
original parties could be powerful evidence in interpreting their 
intent in an action between them. But successor owners of the 
affected parcels may not even know of such a discussion or letter.96 
This letter or discussion might be good, even the best, evidence of 
what the original parties intended. But it would do violence to the 
contract expectations of the successors relying on the written and 
recorded documents if this wild card evidence of “original intent” 
were allowed. This could result in inefficient market decisions and 
unfairness. For successor cases, the “purest meaning” might have 
to give way to the “best expected meaning.”  
Thus, courts should protect subsequent buyers by refocusing 
the judicial inquiry.97 The question should be: At the time of 
purchase, what could a reasonable successor have thought the 
                                                                                                             
 95. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, §§ 
5.02, 8.01; KORNGOLD & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 69, at 269–86.  
 96. See, e.g., Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (unwritten expectation of original parties to easement as to extent of use 
held binding against subsequent purchaser of dominant lot); Latham v. Garner, 
105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) (remanded for trial court to consider 
circumstances surrounding execution of easement between defendants and 
plaintiff—successor owner to the servient land).  
 97. Korngold, Future Generations, supra note 9.  
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original parties intended? This would require the courts to adjust in 
two ways. First, the courts should, whenever possible, rely on the 
express language of the document in making decisions and should 
eschew the use of extrinsic evidence if they can. Second, when 
courts must admit extrinsic evidence because they cannot find the 
understanding from the document alone, they should only admit 
evidence to which the successors could reasonably have had 
access.  
Unfortunately, most courts interpreting land use instruments 
miss the successor issue. They blithely state that deeds are to be 
construed like “ordinary” contracts98 and rely on context at the 
time of drafting regardless of the presence of successors.99 It is the 
rare and appreciated case where the court understands that it is 
engaged in a matter more subtle than first generation contract 
interpretation. One such court insightfully noted that “[p]rospective 
purchasers of property are . . . entitled to know what they will and 
what they will not be permitted to park on their lots [and] nothing 
in the language . . . is calculated to put the reader upon notice.”100 
Therefore, interpretation of private land use agreements—
including conservation easements—should focus on the original 
parties’ intent. When dealing with successor owners though, courts 
should focus on the intention of the original parties in the mind of 
a reasonable successor at the time of the successor’s purchase. 
These rules should control a court’s analysis of a conservation 
easement on the question of whether new energy development was 
contemplated.  
B. Judicial Interpretation of Conservation Easements in General 
The interpretation of conservation easements, whether viewed 
as “covenants” or as “true” easements, should center on the intent 
of the original parties. While denoted as “easements,” conservation 
easements do not truly resemble typical easements.101 Easements 
usually grant affirmative rights in the property of another, such as a 
right of way over another’s land. Instead, conservation easements 
create negative restrictions on property, limiting the owner of the 
burdened property from doing certain acts on the land. Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 98. See, e.g., Christian v. Flora, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 
2008); Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); Wagner v. Woodward, 270 P.3d 21, 25 (Mo. 2012). 
 99. See, e.g., N. Utils., Inc. v. City of S. Portland, 536 A.2d 1116, 1117 
(Me. 1988).  
 100. Lake St. Louis Cmty. Ass’n v. Leidy, 672 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984).  
 101. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1052–54. 
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despite the term “easement,” conservation easements resemble 
covenants. As described above, the law has historically valued and 
enforced easements as utility-maximizing arrangements between 
property owners.102 In contrast, courts have viewed covenants with 
suspicion as hindering an owner’s freedom to deal with her 
property. Thus, to the extent that courts follow the easement 
paradigm based on the name “conservation easement” and 
statutory provisions placing the creation of these interests within 
the law of easements,103 it is more likely that courts will uphold the 
conservation easement’s broad environmental purpose. On the 
other hand, if a court sees a conservation easement as a covenant, it 
may be more likely to construe it narrowly to encourage free use of 
land.  
Moreover, because conservation easements are typically 
perpetual, successor owners will likely be involved in 
interpretation and enforcement actions. The holder of the easement 
could change, when the NPO or governmental entity that initially 
acquires the conservation easement assigns it to another authorized 
holder, perhaps in a situation where the acquiring entity acted as 
facilitator or funder of the transaction.104 Similarly, when the initial 
donor/seller of the easement transfers the remaining fee interest, 
the transferee will take subject to the conservation easement. When 
courts interpret conservation easements in such situations, they 
should take into account the reasonable expectations and 
understandings of successors as to the original intent.  
The limited case law interpreting conservation easements 
adheres to traditional interpretative norms for land agreements.105 
                                                                                                             
 102. See supra Part II.A.1.a. and II.A.2.  
 103. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a) (1982) (providing that 
creation is in the manner of other easements).  
 104. Id. (contemplating assignment of conservation easements). In some 
cases, though, an organization with unlimited life might continue to hold the 
conservation easement and the owner of the burdened property might similarly 
be an entity with a perpetual life, such as a corporation.  
 105. See, e.g., Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 571–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) 
(“The same rules that apply to deeds and other written instruments apply to 
grants of easements: in the construction of instruments creating easements, 
courts ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties.”); Stitzel v. State, 
6 A.3d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (relying on plain meaning of 
agricultural easement to find that land could not be subdivided). See Wooster v. 
Dept. of Fish & Game, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 345–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 
2012) (interpreting a condition subsequent in a conservation easement). See also 
Laura Ingles, Conservation Group Says Trump Golf Course Violates Easement 
Policy, C-VILLE [Charlottesville], May 14, 2013 (describing claim that golf 
course is permitted under language allowing commercial activity that is 
“temporary or seasonal outdoor activities that do not permanently alter the 
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In Nature Conservancy v. Sims,106 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the enforcement of a 
conservation easement by the Conservancy against the original 
grantors. The easement expressly permitted the grantors to 
“enhance their agricultural usage” of the property and to “dig 
wells” and “create ponds,” but barred the removal of topsoil or 
other materials and any change in the topography. The court 
upheld the trial court’s holding that the grantors’ filling of a 
sinkhole behind their residence by placing over 6,000 cubic yards 
of fill material into the depression violated the easement.107 The 
appeals court upheld the trial court’s reliance on the plain meaning 
of the document: 
Where the language of a contract is not ambiguous 
Kentucky law limits a court’s analysis to the “four corners 
of the document.” . . . In determining a contract’s plain 
meaning, the court is “obligated to read the parts of the 
contact as a whole,” and when possible should embrace an 
interpretation that “promote[s] harmony between the 
provisions.”108 
This decision is consistent with traditional interpretation 
methods. Moreover, as the original parties were involved in the 
enforcement action, there were no “second generation” 
interpretation issues.  
Similarly, in Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, the court 
employed conventional interpretation methods in enforcing a 
conservation easement.109 The original property owner conveyed a 
conservation easement on 85 acres of a 100-acre tract to the 
Windham Land Trust.110 Four years later, after an intermediate 
conveyance, the defendants acquired the fee interest to the 
burdened land.111 The easement limited the use of the restricted 
area to “residential recreational purposes.”112 The owners sought to 
use the existing logging roads on the property for wagon and sleigh 
rides, hiking, snowshoeing, and Nordic skiing, and the pond for 
                                                                                                             
 
physical appearance of the Property, and that do not diminish the conservation 
values herein protected.”). 
 106. 680 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 107. Id. at 676. 
 108. Id.  
 109. 967 A.2d 690, 695–96 (Me. 2009). 
 110. Id. at 693. 
 111. Id. at 695. 
 112. Id. at 693. 
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fishing and ice skating—all for paying guests only.113 The 
appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that this was a 
commercial use violating the conservation easement.114 The 
appellate court relied on plain meaning principles: 
The terms “residential recreational purposes” and “non-
residential use” are not defined in the deed. The 
[defendants] urge us to apply a meaning of “residential” as 
that word is, they argue, typically used in land use law. We 
decline to do so. “In evaluating the language of a deed, 
courts should give effect to the common or everyday 
meaning of the words in the instrument.” . . . We apply the 
common everyday understanding of the word “residential,” 
which is “of or relating to residence or residences.” 
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 977 (1979).115 
Like Nature Conservancy v. Sims, Windham relied on classic 
plain meaning principles. Moreover, although successor owners of 
the servient property were involved in Windham, because the gap 
between the creation of the easement and enforcement was so 
short, it is extremely likely that the plain meaning of the original 
parties would have been the same to the defendants when they 
purchased the burdened property.  
Therefore, in the limited case law, courts interpreting 
conservation easements appear to apply traditional rules of 
easement and covenant law to find the parties’ intent. Despite the 
small number of cases, one would expect that these concepts 
would pertain to construing conservation easements in the context 
of new energy development.  
C. Homeowner Association Covenants and Energy Exploitation 
An examination of the body of cases involving disputes within 
covenant communities over an individual owner’s oil, gas, or solar 
development activities provides another reference point on how courts 
may resolve conflicts over conservation easements and new energy 
development. Beginning in the late 19th century, developers responded 
to demand from people seeking homes in areas free from the noise and 
pollution of an increasingly industrialized America.116 These 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 694. 
 114. Id. at 701. 
 115. Windham Land Trust, 967 A.2d at 698.  
 116. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PROPERTY STORIES, 241–42, 257–259 (Gerald 
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, eds., 2d ed.) (2009); Gerald Korngold, The 
Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivisions: The 
Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE. W. RES. 
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developers created large-scale subdivisions by dividing raw land into 
building lots. They employed traditional rules of covenants running 
with the land to limit use of the properties to residential purposes, 
restrict the types of permitted structures, delineate setback and side 
lines, prohibit certain “nuisance” activities, and set other guidelines to 
create a quality residential experience for the lot owners.117 Over time, 
developers used covenants to create subdivisions with common areas, 
such as roadways, utilities, and recreational areas, supported by 
homeowner dues and administered by “private governments” 
comprised of homeowners elected by their peers.118  
These subdivision communities, formed and protected by 
covenants, serve important policy goals inherent in the concept of 
freedom of contract. They allow people to arrive at efficiency 
maximizing arrangements in the marketplace (why does everyone 
need a swimming pool, when a community pool is cheaper and gives 
enough opportunity to swim?) and permit people the freedom to 
choose the living arrangement that they believe will maximize their 
happiness. Many courts have recognized the value of private 
subdivision arrangements, a shift from their historical suspicion of 
covenants as interfering with free use of land.119 This new attitude is 
reflected in both express statements of the courts120 and in various 
decisions upholding these arrangements.121  
                                                                                                             
 
L. REV. 617, 618-621 (2001) [hereinafter Korngold, Private Land Use 
Controls]. 
 117. For examples of early subdivision communities, see Downs v. Kroeger, 
254 P. 1101, 1102–03 (Cal. 1927); Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 498 
(Mich. 1925); Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 
N.E.2d 793, 795 (1938). See also Korngold, Private Land Use Controls, supra 
note 116, at 621–23, (describing of one such community’s development, Shaker 
Heights, Ohio).  
 118. See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and 
Owners Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 
513, 513 (1990).  
 119. See Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009); Downs, 
254 P. 1101; Sanborn, 206 N.W. 496; Neponsit Prop. Owners, 15 N.E.2d 793. 
 120. See, e.g., Beverly Island Ass’n v. Zinger, 317 N.W.2d 611, 612 (Mich. 
1982) (“Building and use restrictions in residential deeds are favored by public 
policy.”); Town Country Estates Ass’n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668, 671 (Mich. 
1987) (“Free use of the property must be balanced against the rights of the other 
purchasers in the subdivision.”); Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887, 
892 (Ohio 1929) (“We see no reason for denying the right of these parties to 
contract between themselves . . . to create a highly exclusive and valuable 
residential district.”). See Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2d Dist. 1992). See also Lake Saint Louis Cmty. Assoc. v. Kamper, 503 
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).  
 121. See cases cited supra note 105.  
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There are several cases where courts have determined whether 
a given subdivision covenant bars oil and gas drilling, solar panels, 
or wind turbines.122 These decisions are instructive for deciding 
conflicts between new energies and conservation easements. First, 
like conservation easements, subdivision covenants require the 
preservation of a certain ambience on the land, which new energy 
development might destroy. Second, both subdivision covenants 
and conservation easements are supported by public policy 
considerations articulated by legislatures and courts. Thus, one 
might expect generally favorable judicial treatment of subdivision 
covenants when challenged by external threats, such as intrusive 
new energy development.  
1. Oil and Gas Drilling  
A number of reported cases involve subdivision covenants that 
expressly bar oil and gas drilling and related exploration 
operations.123 Hirsch v. Hancock, decided by the California Court 
of Appeal in 1959, demonstrates, however, that courts may have to 
construe such express prohibitions.124 In Hirsch, subdivision 
covenants created in 1919 required residential use of the properties 
and provided that no lot could be used for drilling or producing oil, 
gas, or other minerals. Approximately half of the lot owners 
brought an action and received a judgment from the lower court to 
the effect that it would be unjust to prevent the removal of 
subsurface oil, gas, and other minerals from their properties by use 
of slant drilling from surface locations other than these owners’ 
parcels.125 This judgment was upheld by the appellate court, which 
distinguished between surface removal of oil and gas, which was 
prohibited, and subsurface removal via slant drilling from other, 
unrestricted properties.126  
The slant drilling distinction did not appear in the words of the 
restriction. The appellate court reached its result by focusing on the 
                                                                                                             
 122. See cases discussed infra in Part II.C.1., 2., & 3.  
 123. See, e.g., R & R Realty Co. v. Weinstein, 422 P.2d 148, 161 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1966) (prohibiting drilling, derricks or similar structures); Lesley v. 
Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 484–85 (Tex. 2011) (barring drilling); 
Imperial Interplaza II, Inc. v. Corr. Corp. of America, 717 S.W.2d 422, 424 
(Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1986) (barring oil drilling, refinement, 
operations, tanks). See also Thompson v. Paasche, 950 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 
1991) (covenant barring structures did not apply because mineral estate was 
excepted).  
 124. See Hirsch v. Hancock, 343 P.2d 959 (Cal. 1959). 
 125. Id. at 755. 
 126. Id. at 760–61. 
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intent of the subdivider and original purchasers.127 It reasoned that 
slant drilling was unknown in 1919 when the restrictions were 
imposed.128 “[T]he parties did not have in mind the possibility of 
that sort of oil development” and therefore could not have intended 
to bar it.129 The decision, however, fails to adequately determine 
the parties’ intent. The fact that they did not specify slant drilling 
cannot necessarily be seen as a conscious decision to permit it, 
because, as the court states, the practice was not known when the 
covenant was made. The court should have attempted to “fill the 
gap” in the agreement by determining what the parties would have 
intended on this issue had they confronted it. Moreover, because 
successors were involved in the action, as previously suggested, 
the court should have focused on what they could have reasonably 
thought the parties intended on slant drilling in light of the 
language and circumstances.  
While the covenant in Hirsch expressly prohibited oil and gas 
exploration, the court found it did not apply to the particular 
removal method before it.130 In other cases, however, the covenant 
contained no express discussion at all of oil and gas activities. In 
these cases, the courts had to decide whether drilling activity or 
equipment violated the terms of restrictions that limited the 
subdivision to residential activities. Some decisions have found 
that drilling and related activities violate covenants that 
specifically limit the use of lots to residential purposes.131 As the 
court in Reed v. Williamson reasoned:  
It may not be concluded that the drilling of a well or wells 
for oil and gas is a use of the lots for residential purposes or 
that a limitation on the use of the real estate like that 
contained in the restriction in this case does not exclude 
every use of the premises not pertaining to residence 
purposes.132 
One might fairly classify Reed as a plain meaning decision, as 
the court looked at the words of the restriction and ascribed to 
them a meaning in light of ordinary usages of the words. For the 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Hirsch, 343 P.2d at 760. 
 130. Id. at 760–61. 
 131. See, e.g., Reed v. Williamson, 82 N.W.2d 18, 25–27 (Neb. 1957) 
(showing oil and gas drilling not consistent with use for residential area); 
Devendorf v. Akbar Petroleum Corp., 577 N.E.2d 707, 709–10 (Ohio Ct. App., 
Summit County 1989) (providing that the mere formation of drilling units on a 
lot without drilling violated restriction).  
 132. Reed, 82 N.W.2d at 113 (1957).  
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court, enforcement was a simple matter of holding a person to 
one’s contractual obligations: 
The instrument expressing the restrictions contains reciprocal 
and mutual covenants. Appellant thereby bound himself not to 
violate the covenants and if he did, anyone interested in the 
real estate was authorized to enforce them or sue for damages 
at his election.133 
Courts have also held that covenants restricting the type of 
structures that can be built in a subdivision, rather than the use of 
the lots, may prevent the erection of wells and other drilling 
equipment. Thus, restrictions stating that “all lots in this plat are 
restricted to residences only,” with an exception for a few lots “on 
which retail business buildings or apartment houses may be 
erected,” prevented drilling for oil and gas.134 The court explained 
its interpretative theory:  
Under the rule of strict construction . . . this clause does not 
prevent drilling wells for oil and gas. But this seems to us 
to strain the plain import of the language used. The clause 
is not ambiguous. The clear intention of the parties 
gathered from the clause in its entirety is that Lincoln 
Terrace addition must be used exclusively for residences 
and no other purpose, except that in block 20 these 
restrictions are relaxed to permit retail business buildings or 
apartment houses. Aside from these specified uses, all other 
uses are prevented in block 20 as well as the other blocks in 
the addition.135 
The decisions construing subdivision covenants, therefore, 
focus on the plain meaning of the word “residential” and prohibit 
oil and gas drilling. Depending on the terms of a given 
conservation easement, a court using such a plain meaning 
approach may reject similar activities on conservation easement 
property. The slant drilling situation, however, presents a different 
issue as no non-residential “structure” is being installed on the 
conservation land and the non-residential “use” or “activity” is 
only beneath the surface. A court might find, perhaps, that slant 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. at 112. 
 134. See, e.g., Sw. Petroleum Co. v. Logan, 71 P.2d 759, 760 (Neb. 1937); 
Smith Oil Co. v. Logan, 71 P.2d 766, 767 (Ok. 1937). These are companion 
cases that call into doubt a contrary result in the earlier Cooke v. Kinkead, 64 
P.2d 682 (Ok. 1937) (a 5-4 decision finding drilling compatible with a 
residential only restriction). Cooke’s position appears to be an outlier, within 
Oklahoma and nationally.  
 135. Smith Oil Co., 71 P.2d at 767–68.  
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drilling from an unrestricted land under conservation easement 
property is permitted under such a reading.  
2. Solar  
Individual homeowners have faced litigation from neighbors 
and homeowners associations claiming that the homeowner’s 
installation of solar panels or related technology violates a 
subdivision covenant. The devices arguably violate aesthetic or 
architectural standards that subdivisions impose generally to 
protect aesthetic and property values of the community. The results 
in these cases are often guided by express statutory policies 
favoring non-renewables.136  
In one case, homeowners installed six, 14-foot high, 8-foot 
wide solar panels in their side yard.137 Neighbors brought suit 
alleging that the panels violated restrictive covenants governing the 
subdivision.138 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the complaint.139 The appellate court reasoned, in light 
of the high aesthetic values of the community, that the complaint 
stated a cause of action for breach of covenant that provided that 
no “nuisances [shall] be maintained . . . which may in any manner 
[be] dangerous or noxious or offensive to the neighborhood 
inhabitants.”140 The opinion focused on the meaning of the 
agreement of the parties—standard interpretation of intention—and 
did not mention countervailing policy considerations favoring 
renewable energy.141 
A number of states have trumped private agreements by 
enacting legislation limiting the enforcement of aesthetic 
covenants against solar energy devices.142 These statutes reflect 
                                                                                                             
 136. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2002) (limiting effect of 
aesthetic restrictions on solar devices); Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 
227 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (requiring proposed solar units to be 
submitted to the association’s “art jury” and to comply with solar unit 
guidelines). See also Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting 
Residential Access to Solar Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 FLA. 
ST. L. REV. 995 (2013).  
 137. Faler v. Haines, 962 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t. 
2013).  
 138. Id. at 501. 
 139. Id. at 502. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 
(2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2002). See generally Governor’s Ranch 
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Gunther, 705 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding 
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“the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of solar 
energy systems and to remove the obstacles thereto,”143 and require 
aesthetic considerations to take a secondary position behind energy 
goals. The California Solar Rights Act, for example, bars homeowner 
associations from imposing covenants that effectively prohibit 
installation of a solar energy system.144 The statute, however, allows 
“reasonable” restrictions on a solar energy system “that do not 
significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that 
allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and 
energy conservation benefits.”145 Decisions concerning the 
reasonableness of the association’s decision are findings of fact, 
requiring deference from the appellate courts.146 These cases focus on 
statutory interpretation primarily rather than on the understanding of 
the covenant. In these states, public policy via statute is the controlling 
consideration, rather than private agreement.  
3. Wind Turbines  
One reported case, which held that the erection of a wind turbine 
did not create a private nuisance, briefly considered whether the 
turbine violated a subdivision covenant that required approval from an 
architectural board before construction.147 The court held that there 
was no violation because the developer and other residents had 
abandoned the covenants, a type of waiver theory.148 The court, 
therefore, did not explicate the meaning of the covenant but rather 
applied a rule of law abrogating it.  
4. Lessons for Conservation Easements and New Energies 
While there are a limited number of cases dealing with the 
conflict of subdivision covenants and new energy development, 
                                                                                                             
 
that evaporative device combined with solar panels constituted protected solar 
device under the statute).  
 143. Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 167, 175 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011). See Garden Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. 
Madigan, 62 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
 144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(a) (2007). See Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr.3d at 173.  
 145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(b). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (limiting 
effect of aesthetic restrictions to “reasonable restrictions…which do not 
significantly increase the price of the device”).  
 146. See, e.g., Garden Lakes, 62 P.3d at 986; Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. 
Rodman, 227 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986).  
 147. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 639 (N.D. 1992). 
 148. On abandonment in general, see KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at § 11.05.  
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some tentative lessons may be drawn for treatment of conservation 
easements by way of analogy. First, when interpreting the 
subdivision covenants, the courts focus primarily on the language 
of the instrument. The courts exhibit a tendency to find the intent 
of the parties from the “plain meaning” of the language. Moreover, 
to the extent that judges consider policy to support their 
interpretations, they appear to focus exclusively on the mutuality 
of the restriction and expectation of all of the homeowners that the 
subdivision plan would be respected. The countervailing policies, 
such as the benefits of solar energy or the public demand for fossil 
fuels, were not considered unless there was an express statute 
requiring the covenant to give way to solar devices. But again, the 
sample is small.  
Thus, it is possible that when courts entertain claims that a 
conservation easement permits new energy development, they will 
limit their inquiry to the specific language used by the parties and, 
perhaps, the clearly articulated legislative policy favoring 
conservation easements as exemplified in authorizing statutes. The 
courts could follow the limited case law from homeowners 
associations, and not delve too greatly into countervailing public 
policies that favor new energy development (carbon-based, 
renewable, or both). Proponents of the consideration of other 
policies will have to convince the court to take a broader view than 
exemplified in the subdivision interpretation cases.  
D. Cases Involving Fracking on Land under Conservation 
Easements 
Courts confronting the question of whether a conservation 
easement permits new energy development will have to determine 
the intent of the parties under the instrument. Some easement 
language may address the issue directly: an express prohibition on 
“removing any fossil fuel” from the property would apparently ban 
fracking. Other clauses may not be so clear: Would a ban on 
accessory structures necessarily include wind turbines? The variety 
of conservation easements employed by parties to such transactions 
will require close consideration by courts where the intention is 
unclear.149  
                                                                                                             
 149. Language that might be relevant to the permissibility of new energy 
development can be found in the following sample conservation easements: 
Sample 1. JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI, PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, 516–22 (Julie Ann Gustanski & 
Roderick H. Squires, eds., 2000). (Grant of Conservation Easement and 
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, set out as Appendix B). Sample 1 
provides for a grant of a conservation easement in gross “for the purpose of 
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Two recent cases have addressed the specific question of the 
permissibility of fracking on land restricted by conservation 
easements. They illustrate the difficulties inherent in easement 
language that does not clearly address the issue.  
1. Stockport Mountain 
Stockport Mountain Corporation LLC v. Norcross Wildlife 
Foundation, Inc. was the subject of three unpublished opinions by 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania––one released in March 2012, a second in August 
                                                                                                             
 
preserving the natural state of the Property for . . . conserving and protecting the 
Property and surrounding lands from soil erosion, water pollution, natural 
disruptions and other occurrences which might interfere with the beauty and 
unique character of the Property.” Further, the Grantor “covenants and agrees 
with Grantee that the Property shall remain in its present nature and scenic 
state.” Specific clauses bar “commercial and/or industrial activities including . . . 
the construction . . . of pipe lines; construction that will “destroy or impair the 
scenic enjoyment of the view by the public;” and the “removal of rock, minerals, 
gravel, sand, topsoil or other similar materials.” The grantor is permitted to build 
“accessory buildings such as garages and storage sheds” in the vicinity of the 
permitted single family residence.  
Sample 2. John G. Cameron, Jr., What You Should Know About Conservation 
Easements (With Form), 26 PRAC. REAL ESTATE. LAWYER 9 (July 2010).This 
form contains the grant of a conservation easement. It additionally states that 
“the Property possesses natural, scenic, open space, scientific, biological and 
ecological values of prominent importance to the Donor, the Conservancy and 
the public,” known as “Conservation Values.” It offers an apparently broad 
protection of the existing environmental conditions by stating that “any activity 
on or use of the Property inconsistent with the purposes of this Conservation 
Easement or detrimental to the Conservation Values is expressly prohibited.” 
The form also bars certain activities, including, “commercial or industrial 
activity,” “the placement or construction of any man-made modification, such as 
buildings, structures, fences, roads and parking lots,” and “any mining or 
alteration of the surface of the land.” 
Sample 3. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION 
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, (The Land Trust Alliance and the Trust for Public Land 
CD-ROM, 2nd ed. July 2005). Sample 3 contains a similar broad definition of 
Conservation Values and states that the purpose of the conservation easement is 
to preserve and protect these values. It provides that “any activity on or use of 
the Protected Property that is inconsistent with the purposes of this easement is 
prohibited.” The form includes specific bans on “industrial or commercial use” 
and on “mining, drilling, exploring for or removing of any materials or fossil 
fuels;” this latter clause, appears to clearly bar oil and gas extraction through any 
means, a matter about which the other forms were not as definitive. Sample 3 
also provides that “no temporary or permanent buildings, structures, roads or 
other improvements of any kind may be placed or constructed” on the property.  
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2013, and a brief opinion in 2014.150 In Stockport I, the plaintiff, 
Stockport—owner of land subject to a conservation easement held 
by the defendant Norcross Wildlife Foundation (Norcross)—
brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was 
permitted to drill and extract natural gas through fracking on the 
property.151 The land had originally been acquired in fee by a 
subsidiary of Norcross, which conveyed the easement to Norcross 
and then conveyed the fee to Stockport.152  
Norcross sought a motion to dismiss the complaint and 
Stockport filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.153 The 
opinions in this case illustrate the key role of the judiciary in the 
interpretation of the intention of the parties. The court applied 
construction devices utilized in covenant and easement law, as well 
as specific subject matter related policies.154  
In Stockport I, the court dismissed Stockport’s motion for 
summary judgment and then addressed Norcross’s motion to 
dismiss, applying the standard of whether the complaint alleged 
sufficient facts to sustain the cause of action.155 Norcross claimed 
that the proposed extraction of natural gas by hydrofracture drilling 
violated the express language of the conservation easement.156 
Although fracking was not listed as a prohibited activity in the 
easement document, Norcross claimed that it was prohibited 
because of Pennsylvania’s “preference for liberally construing 
conservation easements.”157 The court cited the state’s enabling act 
language that provides that “any general rule of construction to the 
contrary notwithstanding, conservation or preservation easements 
shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein 
to affect the purpose of those easements and the policy and the 
purpose of this act.”158  
The court explained that it would follow Pennsylvania’s rule of 
construction.159 First, the court would look at the language of the 
contract to determine intent, and if the language was unambiguous, 
                                                                                                             
 150. Stockport Mt. Corp. LLC v. Norcross Wildlife Found., Inc., 2012 WL 
719345 (U.S. Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2012) (Stockport I), 2013 WL 4538822 (U.S. 
Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2013) (Stockport II). A subsequent opinion, 2014 WL 116311 
(U.S. Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2014) upheld an award of attorney’s fees to Norcross.  
 151. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *2. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at *7. 
 155. Id. at *5–6. 
 156. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *5–6.  
 157. Id. at *6. 
 158. Id. See also 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5055(c)(2) (West 2001).  
 159. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *7. 
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the court would enforce the express language.160 The court then 
noted that easement grants are to be construed like contracts, 
apparently following the “easement” label in conservation 
easements rather than their true nature as covenants.161 Norcross 
claimed that the easement was unambiguous and that drilling 
violated three express prohibitions of the easement: the drilling 
constituted prohibited “industrial or commercial uses;” resulted in 
the “depositing … of chemical substances” on the property; and 
required installation of “new roads.”162 Additionally, fracking 
violated the express purpose of the easement to preserve 
conservation values, protect plant life and habitats, and prevent soil 
erosion and water pollution.163 Finally, the fracking operation 
otherwise interfered with the property’s beauty and unique 
character in its then current state.164  
The court, however, rejected Norcross’s claim that the right to 
pursue fracking was clearly and unambiguously prohibited by 
easement and denied the motion to dismiss.165 Rather, the court 
found that the “crucial provisions” of the easement were 
ambiguous.166 The court noted that “[a]lthough this statement 
outlines the parties’ aspirations, the court cannot determine at this 
stage in the litigation that this provision prohibits natural gas 
drilling because it is too vague.”167 The court also found that 
despite the stated ban on industrial and commercial uses, other 
provisions in the easement approved certain of such uses.168 Thus, 
discovery was required to determine the intended definitions of 
“commercial” and “industrial.”169 Moreover, Stockport’s allegation 
that the prohibition of chemical release only applied to surface 
chemicals and that it planned only a subsurface release rendered 
the easement clause ambiguous.170 Finally, Stockport alleged that 
construction of new roads was largely unnecessary.171 Thus, the 
court found that Stockport had “adequately pled facts creating 
ambiguity,” and a motion to dismiss was not appropriate.172  
                                                                                                             
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *7. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345. 
 170. Id. at *8. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
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In Stockport II, however, the same judge considered a motion 
for summary judgment by Norcross after the parties engaged in 
discovery and fully briefed and argued the issue.173 The court, in 
this second opinion, granted the motion for summary judgment 
finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect 
to the permissibility of surface drilling under the conservation 
easement. Interestingly, the court deviated from its prior opinion 
on the motion to dismiss where it found ambiguity.  
The court in Stockport II explained that the burden to show 
ambiguity rests on the party making that claim.174 To determine if 
a contract is ambiguous, the court said it would consider the 
language of the instrument, alternative meanings suggested by 
counsel, and objective evidence such as the bargaining history and 
the parties’ conduct that reveals their understanding of the 
words.175 But, the court declared that it ultimately came down to 
the language that the parties used in the agreement: “Extrinsic 
evidence notwithstanding, the parties remain bound by the 
appropriate objective definition of the words they use to express 
their intent.”176 The court went on, “The words constituting the 
conservation easement are susceptible to only one reasonable 
interpretation with respect to the instant issue; surface natural gas 
drilling is prohibited. To reach this conclusion, the court did not 
need to look beyond section 4(c) of the easement, which prohibits 
‘industrial or commercial uses of any kind.’”177 The court then 
looked to dictionary definitions of “commercial” and “industrial” 
to find that Stockport’s planned lease to a natural gas driller in 
return for rent and royalties was “commerce” and the use of 
machinery to drill and remove natural gas was “industrial” in 
nature.178 Moreover, the court indicated that the ambiguities that it 
had noted in Stockport I—such as the easement expressly 
permitting timbering and quarrying—no longer compelled a 
finding of ambiguity.179 Finally, the court noted that the absence of 
an express prohibition on drilling does not create an ambiguity.180  
                                                                                                             
 173. Stockport II, 2013 WL 4538822 at *7. Judge James M. Munley, United 
States District Judge, presided in both Stockport I and Stockport II. See id. at *1; 
2012 WL 719345 at *1.  
 174. Stockport II, 2013 WL 4538822 at *9. 
 175. Id. at *10. 
 176. Stockport II, at *10 (quoting Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 
636 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2011); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 
619 F.2d 1001, 103 (3d Cir. 1980)).  
 177. Id. at *10.  
 178. Id. at *11. 
 179. Id. at *11–12. 
 180. Id. 
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The court explained that extrinsic evidence supported its reading 
that the language of the conservation easement unambiguously barred 
drilling for natural gas.181 Stockport argued that the parties did not 
contemplate the feasibility of shale gas production by fracking when 
they signed the conservation easement, and thus did not intend to bar 
it.182 The court, however, turned this proposition on its head, noting 
that “[t]he external evidence Stockport points to, however, does not 
reasonably establish that the parties to the conservation easement 
intended to permit surface gas activities.”183 The court instead chose to 
rely on what it considered to be the unambiguous language of the 
agreement. Given that the parties had apparently not considered the 
fracking issue because technology did not permit it at the time, the 
court should have gone beyond the words and looked at other evidence 
to discern what the parties would have intended on the issue.  
There are several important takeaways from the two Stockport 
opinions. They illustrate the difficulty in determining whether any 
given language is “ambiguous” or “unambiguous”—the same court 
appears to have changed its view on this issue from the first to the 
second opinion. Language that can be fairly read to prohibit 
fracking—commercial and industrial use bans—may not be clear 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, there are limits to the 
“plain meaning” even when the meaning is arguably clear. As a result, 
a trial will be required to consider extrinsic evidence to find the 
parties’ intent. This will be costly for both sides—for an NPO or 
entrepreneurial company with constrained capital—and time 
consuming—extending the period of uncertainty for the nonprofit and 
postponing a return on investment for the company. Stockport 
Mountain demonstrates that it is essential not only to make the intent 
clear, but also to make it sufficient to be adjudicated without an 
evidentiary showing. The parties could attempt to settle after denial of 
a motion to dismiss, but this would require flexibility and, as discussed 
below, the NPO may be hampered in attempts to modify the easement 
through settlement. For parties concerned about oil and gas drilling, 
the best protection would be through an express clause in the original 
easement agreement.  
2. Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Conservancy  
In Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Conservancy, the plaintiffs’ 
predecessor in title granted a conservation easement, which was 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. at *13. 
 182. Stockport II, at *13. 
 183. Id. at *14 (emphasis added).  
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recorded, to the defendant-conservancy.184 Some two weeks later 
the predecessor conveyed the land in fee to plaintiffs.185 Plaintiffs 
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of 
the conservation easement as they sought to permit removal of oil 
and gas from their property by horizontal drilling from an adjacent, 
unrestricted lot.186 The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
judgment on the pleadings.187 
The trial court agreed with the Stockport opinions on the 
interpretative ground rules in Pennsylvania, stating that “[w]hen 
the words of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, the intent of 
the parties is to be ascertained from the language used in the 
agreement.”188 Importantly, the easement in Ray contained an 
express provision stating that “[n]o drilling or other removal of . . . 
gas . . . or similar . . . materials from the real estate shall occur.”189 
Plaintiffs argued, though, that the easement was meant only to 
protect surface features of the land, and thus subsurface horizontal 
drilling from a neighboring tract should be permitted.190  
Ray, like Stockport II, relied on a reading of the easement 
instrument alone to prohibit the proposed drilling. Following the 
opinion of Stockport I, the court could have found the Ray 
language ambiguous for failing to clarify the distinction between 
surface and subsurface drilling and denied a decision on the 
pleadings; or the court may have required factual determination of 
the effects of the different processes on the protected land, specific 
understandings of the parties, and other information. Instead, the 
Ray court relied only on its “comprehensive reading” of the 
easement, which led  
to the conclusion that the parties intended a broader 
conservation effect than simply protecting the surface 
features of the land. In the agreement, reference is made to 
protecting nature environmental systems, protecting 
conservation values, conserving the quality of water 
resources, maintaining and protecting forested areas in order 
to protect water resources, conserving biological diversity, 
fostering the growth of healthy and unfragmented forest, 
                                                                                                             
 184. 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 367 (Pa. County Ct. 2011), aff’d, 68 
A.3d 368 (Pa. Super. 2013).  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at *3–4. The facts in the opinion are unclear whether this was 
“traditional” slant drilling or horizontal drilling used in fracking.  
 187. Id. at *6. 
 188. Id. at *4. 
 189. Id. at *5.  
 190. 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 367, at *5. 
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conserving native species, maintaining a continuous canopy 
of trees, shrubs, wild flowers and grasses, maintaining, 
breeding, sites and migration corridors for birds and wildlife, 
and protecting biological integrity, natural resources and 
ecosystems.191 
E. Going Forward  
In both Ray and Stockport II, the courts favored interpreting 
conservation easement documents based on their language alone 
and did not look to extrinsic evidence. By doing so, the courts were 
able to dispose of claims on the pleadings and determine the rights 
under the conservation easement, avoiding expensive and long 
trials that would be necessary to weigh additional extrinsic facts. 
The courts did not explicitly rely on public policies favoring 
conservation easements or new energy development in their 
decisions, but rather focused on the contractual undertakings of the 
parties.  
These cases remind drafters of a crucial lesson—to avoid 
uncertainty and costly litigation, it is imperative to make the 
document fully reflect the intent of the parties in light of current 
circumstances and possible events that the future might bring. 
More is better in drafting these documents. General, catch-all 
language expressing the spirit and purpose of the easement may 
provide direction for the parties and a decisionmaker in a future 
dispute.  
Despite best efforts to provide a solution by drafting, questions 
will almost inevitably arise in the future given the perpetual nature 
of conservation easements and inexorable change. Although Ray 
and Stockport II eschewed extrinsic evidence, not all courts may be 
so inclined.192 A court may employ a more liberal attitude towards 
extrinsic evidence. Moreover, broadening the inquiry beyond the 
words of the document allows the court an opportunity to consider, 
explicitly or implicitly, underlying policy considerations, such as 
where the balance should be found between conservation and new 
energy priorities under current circumstances.193 
                                                                                                             
 191. Id. at *5–6.  
 192. See Orlando Lake Forest Joint Venture v. Lake Forest Master Cmty., 
105 So. 3d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Davista Holdings, LLC v. 
Capital Plaza, Inc., 741 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Ga. App. 2013); Taddei v. Vill. Creek 
Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 725 S.E.2d 451, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); Cobb v. 
Allen, 460 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Ala. 1984); Borton v. Forest Hill Country Club, 
926 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); 810 Properties v. Jump, 170 P.3d 
1209, 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).  
 193. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing covenants and public policy).  
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III. CONSENSUAL MODIFICATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
TO PERMIT NEW ENERGIES 
When an agreement does not allow a party to take a certain 
action or the party is unwilling to take the risk of acting where it is 
unclear if such behavior is permitted, the parties too often bargain 
to amend the original understanding to specifically authorize the 
activity. Theoretically, therefore, the fee owner and easement 
owner (an NPO or government) should be able to agree to modify 
a conservation easement to permit development of some or all of 
the new energies. As this section will show, however, there are 
legal hurdles to achieving a valid amendment between the fee 
owner and conservation easement holder. 
A. Modification by Nonprofit Holder 
If an NPO holder of a conservation easement seeks to amend a 
conservation easement to permit fracking, wind turbines, or solar 
devices on the burdened property, there are questions as to whether 
the NPO has the power to do so without judicial approval. 
Moreover, such a decision will likely create problems with respect 
to the easement donor’s tax deduction. 
1. Power to Amend  
There is currently significant debate on the question of whether 
an NPO can simply agree, without more, to amend a conservation 
easement. Some argue that all gifts of conservation easements 
create charitable trusts.194 This would mean that, under charitable 
trust law, changes can only be made if the original purpose of the 
easement becomes impossible or impracticable.195 An arguably 
rational choice by the NPO to permit new energy development in 
exchange for a payment to be used to further the NPO’s other 
conservation works (or a swap of land with even higher 
conservation values) would not meet the impossibility or 
impracticability tests. Thus, the amendment would not be 
permitted in the charitable trust context.  
Moreover, a proposed change of a charitable trust must be 
approved by a court in a cy pres proceeding.196 The state attorney 
                                                                                                             
 194. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of 
Conservation Easements: A Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 
1 (2009).  
 195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
 196. Id. § 399 cmts. d, e.  
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general has authority to contest the amendment on the grounds that 
it does not serve the public interest.197 The attorney general’s 
involvement and the requirement for court approval, at a 
minimum, would add transaction costs, divert limited NPO funds 
from conservation activities to attorney costs, delay the 
amendment process, and may prevent the change altogether.  
Proponents of the charitable trust classification for 
conservation easement gifts maintain that this would better protect 
the public interest in conservation lands, ensure that the charitable 
deduction is not subverted by allowing a modification benefitting 
the donor, and best respect the perpetual nature of conservation 
easements.198 Others, however, reject the view that a gift of a 
conservation easement automatically creates a charitable trust.199 
They maintain that there is a lack of requisite intent to create a 
trust; trust law unnecessarily constrains easement holders from 
achieving conservation goals through modifications and 
alterations; and the general provisions of the IRC sufficiently 
ensure that any modifications will serve the public interest because 
the nonprofit would otherwise lose its tax-exempt status.200  
The disputing sides have marshaled various arguments to 
support their positions, yet there is no clear winner.201 For the 
purposes of this Article, however, the takeaway is that consensual 
modifications by the fee owner and holder of a conservation 
easement to permit new energy development may not be 
enforceable. Moreover, given this uncertainty, volunteer trustees of 
NPOs may hesitate to vote for easement alterations out of a fear of 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. § 391 cmt. a.  
 198. See McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 194, at 5, 27-28, 55-56, 70-71, 
80-82. 
 199. See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense 
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 201. See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at 
508–13. I personally find the charitable trust argument unconvincing unless 
there is a clearly expressed, intent to create a trust; otherwise, the gift of the 
easement should be treated like any other unrestricted gift to a charitable 
organization. Id. at 511–12; Id. n.193. At the same time, I urge the different 
sides to move the discussion from one of classification as a trust or not to a 
policy-based examination of what should be required for alteration of a 
conservation easement, which parties should be involved, and whether judicial 
approval is necessary. Id. at 511–12.  
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personal liability, thus creating a further drag on flexibility in 
easements.202  
2. Federal Tax Issues 
The IRC and its accompanying Regulations require that a 
donor create a conservation easement in perpetuity in order to 
qualify for an income tax deduction.203 The one exception remotely 
relevant to this Article’s consideration provides that if a court 
determines that the accomplishment of a conservation easement’s 
purpose becomes impossible or impracticable, the easement may 
be released. In such case, the easement holder must be paid a 
portion of the consideration, which it must reinvest consistent with 
the original easement purposes.204 The regulation does not provide 
relief for the hypothetical scenario where a conservation 
organization seeks to amend an easement to allow new energy 
development simply to allow it to obtain funds to further its 
mission or to swap for land with higher conservation values. In this 
hypothetical scenario, the original deduction would be at risk.  
B. Modification by Governmental Holder 
A governmental holder might seek to modify a conservation 
easement that it holds. It may, for example, consider altering an 
easement to permit installation of wind turbines in order to achieve 
clean energy goals.205 In such a situation, the government easement 
owner would face the challenges based on charitable trust doctrine 
and federal tax issues discussed above. Moreover, governments 
must confront additional arguments against alteration of easement 
terms.  
1. Standing 
The ability of governmental conservation easement holders to 
agree to modifications is complicated by rules in jurisdictions who 
grant standing to citizens to independently enforce the easements.206 
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These rules have the advantages of empowering “private attorneys 
general” to ensure that conservation goals are advanced. They create 
the risk, however, of lessening flexibility in land use and weakening 
the democratic process by permitting individual citizens to counter 
the decisions of elected and accountable public representatives. 
Moreover, some citizens find conservation easements attractive 
because they improve the value of their individual, neighboring 
properties rather than as a means to provide a general public good. 
These owners thus might engage in rent-seeking behavior with 
respect to easement decisions.  
Government easement holders should be required to follow 
procedural requirements, but it seems sensible that they should not 
have to experience delay and spend taxpayer funds to defend a 
substantive decision against dissenting owners. These owners 
should rely on the democratic and elective process for vindication. 
Still, the threat of litigation may dissuade a governmental body 
from entering into a modification to permit new energy 
development on land over which it holds a conservation easement.  
2. Specific Statutory Provisions  
Three types of state legislation may limit governments from 
modifying or terminating conservation easements.207 First, some 
legislation authorizing general conservation easements provides 
limits on termination, such as requiring the approval of a public 
body.208 Other statutes establishing specific types of conservation 
easement programs set out precise requirements for release, 
termination, and modification of such easements.209 Finally, 
general laws controlling the sale of governmental assets can be 
viewed as applying to reconveyance of an easement right in whole 
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(termination) or in part (modification). Such transfers may require 
various procedural and substantive regulations.210 These statutory 
requirements, therefore, may make it more difficult for a 
governmental entity to modify a conservation easement to permit 
new energy development.  
IV. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS 
There are various doctrines, drawn from the law of covenants, 
which a fee owner could rely upon to request the court to modify 
or terminate a conservation easement in order to permit the 
development of new energies. These include the doctrines of 
changed conditions, relative hardship, and prohibition of covenants 
violating public policy. These doctrines, however, may not be 
helpful to the fee owner except perhaps under the most unusual 
circumstances.  
A. Changed Conditions  
By applying the doctrine of changed conditions, a court will no 
longer enforce a covenant if conditions have changed since its 
creation so that enforcement can no longer accomplish the original 
benefits or purpose of the covenant.211 The changed conditions 
theory could theoretically be applied in the conservation easements 
setting.212 For example, pollution and development to surrounding 
properties might make the accomplishment of an easement to 
protect habitat no longer possible. Similarly, climate change may 
degrade all conservation values from the subject properties. 
Proponents may resist application of the changed conditions theory 
in such cases, though, arguing that any open space is valuable and 
even more necessary when surrounding lands have become more 
developed.  
The changed conditions theory provides an answer to deal with 
obsolete covenants that no longer serve a significant purpose. It 
may prove useful to an owner seeking to develop new energies 
where the conservation easement no longer is effective. However, 
the changed conditions theory does not provide a mechanism for 
                                                                                                             
 210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-11-4 (2013) (procedure); N.Y. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1 (requirement of “adequate consideration”).  
 211. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, 
453–55. 
 212. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1077–78. 
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courts to balance a public interest in new energy exploration 
against a still viable conservation property right.  
B. Relative Hardship 
Though there are various formulations of the doctrine of 
relative hardship, a common articulation is that a court will not 
specifically enforce a covenant and will allow only damages if the 
harm from the injunction would be disproportionate to its 
benefits.213 In applying the test, the courts typically focus on the 
positions of the two parties and do not factor in the public’s 
interest in whether an injunction should be granted.214 As currently 
conceived, the relative hardship rule differs, for example, from the 
standard in nuisance cases where courts expressly consider the 
public interest in determining whether to grant an injunction or 
limit the injured party to money damages.215  
Thus, under a traditional relative hardship doctrine, it would be 
unlikely that a court would factor in any public interest in new 
energy development in determining whether to grant an injunction. 
Under a standard relative hardship doctrine where the court 
evaluates only the competing positions of the parties, it would be 
hard for the fee owner to show that monetary damages would be 
sufficient to protect the property right of the conservation easement 
holder. The easement holder values its property interest for its 
unique ecological values, rather than as an economic asset or a 
commodity. Under such circumstances, it would seem appropriate 
that a court would grant the traditional injunction remedy to protect 
property rights rather than the market-based damages remedy.  
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, however, 
suggests that the interest of the public should be expressly 
considered by the courts in determining the remedy for breach of a 
servitude.216 Under such an approach, a court might find that an 
injunction should not be issued, barring a relatively small intrusion 
(in terms of acreage, environmental fallout, etc.) on a conservation 
easement from a new energy development, but require the violator 
to pay compensation.  
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C. Covenants Violating Public Policy 
Courts often state that covenants violating public policy will 
not be enforced, though there are few cases where courts actually void 
covenants on this theory.217 One noteworthy line of cases involved 
courts invalidating subdivision covenants barring group homes, 
holding that these restrictions breached a clear statutory and regulatory 
policy favoring such institutions.218 Not only do conservation 
easements not violate public policy, but rather, they are favored by 
public policy, as evidenced by their statutory authorization and public 
subsidy.219 Thus, in all but the unusual case, courts should enforce 
these property rights.  
In a rare instance, however, a court might find that a competing 
public policy might necessitate the modification of a conservation 
easement. It remains unclear whether the public interest in 
development of carbon-based or renewable energies is one of those 
situations. It would be a hard case to make: because there are only a 
limited number of decisions where courts have invoked public policy 
to actually void covenants (and those covenants are not even supported 
by strong public policy), it appears that courts would not be disposed 
to striking conservation easements, which by contrast are favored by 
statute and other public policies.  
V. TERMINATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS BY EMINENT 
DOMAIN 
Like other easements220 and covenants,221 conservation 
easements should be subject to eminent domain takings.222 Some 
conservation easement statutes specifically provide that these 
interests are subject to being taken by eminent domain.223 As with 
other easements in gross, there would be a special measure of 
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damages for the easement holder: the difference in the value of the 
burdened land with, and without the covenant.224 Thus, a partial 
taking of an easement could theoretically be made, allowing new 
energy development to take place on a small portion of a large 
property encumbered by a conservation restriction, with payment 
to the conservation easement holder.  
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelo 
v. City of New London,225 upholding the use of eminent domain for 
economic development under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, generated a backlash among the public, 
scholars, and state lawmakers.226 Various voices within the anti-
Kelo camp have maintained that the Fifth Amendment’s “public 
use” requirement does not permit economic development takings 
or takings that result in the transfer from one private owner to 
another.227 Professor Ilya Somin has examined state legislative 
responses to Kelo and their attempts to limit economic 
development takings and “private to private” takings.228  
The question is whether, in light of state reforms post-Kelo, 
governmental takings of conservation easements will be upheld.229 
Until now, courts have held that condemnation of land for oil and 
gas pipes met the public use test, provided that the public has equal 
access to purchase the oil and gas.230 Arguably, this would be the 
case with an exploration company developing gas supply for sale 
through fracking. Similarly, courts held that the taking of land to 
build and maintain facilities to generate electricity for sale to the 
public is for a public use.231 The taking of a conservation easement 
                                                                                                             
 224. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at 
475.  
 225. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
 226. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1082–83. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to 
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2114–38 (2009) (finding many of these efforts 
ineffective due to broad blight exceptions, poorly worded legislation, and other 
factors).  
 229. See Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: 
Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 623, 641–43 (2006) (arguing that economic development can cause 
environment damage and land owned by nonprofit environmental groups is not 
in the tax base and thus particularly vulnerable to local government seeking to 
increase revenue producing property).  
 230. See generally Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 114 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1962); Ohio Oil Co. v. Fowler, 100 So. 2d 
128 (Miss. 1958); McEwen v. MCR, LLC, 291 P.3d 1253 (Mont. 2012).  
 231. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Use of Tenn. Valley Auth. v. An Easement and 
Right-of-Way Over 1.8 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Maury County, Tenn., 
682 F.Supp. 353 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Atkinson v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 
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would ultimately involve the transfer of a property right from one 
private party (the NPO holder) to another (the fee owner would get 
the right back, and then lease it to the energy developer). This 
could raise concerns for those objecting to “private to private” 
transfers. The fact that the transferee is operating in essence as a 
public utility, however, may blunt this argument. Thus, even in an 
anti-Kelo environment and legal regime, the taking of a 
conservation easement for new energy development might be 
upheld.  
CONCLUSION 
Over recent years, the rapid growth in the use of conservation 
easements and the search for new energies—carbon-based and 
renewables—have been important developments affecting 
American land ownership and policy. Recently, questions have 
emerged as to whether and how conservation easements and new 
energy development are compatible. The particular issues are 
whether fracking, wind turbines, and solar devices can be sited or 
operate on land subject to a conservation easement.  
This Article shows several key factors influence the answer to 
these questions. The agreement of the parties on the issue will 
control, but interpreting an ambiguous agreement poses challenges 
to the courts and risks to the parties: the IRC provisions concerning 
deductibility of conservation easements may have a profound 
effect on whether a shift may be made to energy development and 
the type of permissible activities; consensual modification of the 
landowner and the easement holder to permit energy development 
may be complicated by the law of charitable trusts; certain 
nonconsensual modification doctrines to permit energy 
development might be applied by the courts; and a governmental 
taking of the conservation easement remains a possibility although 
not as straightforward under state law reforms post-Kelo.  
One important lesson is that parties are best served if the 
original conservation easement document addresses the issue of 
energy development. Hindsight, however, is 20-20. The parties, the 
courts, and society are left to address those disputes where the 
original parties have not determined the issue consensually.  
To better enable current and future generations to resolve 
questions that the parties have left open, this Article suggests 
several initiatives that may prove helpful. First, judicial 
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interpretation methods for conservation easements should be 
clarified so courts should not presume that the failure to mention a 
technology ultimately developed in the future means that the 
parties intended that it be prohibited. Rather, the courts in such 
situations should determine from the whole document and extrinsic 
evidence what the parties would have intended on the issue. At the 
same time, though, courts should remember that successor parties 
might have a more limited understanding of the original intent. 
Consequently, they should only hold successors to what the 
successors reasonably could have thought the original parties 
intended.  
Second, doctrines concerning the amendment and modification 
of conservation easements need to be clarified by courts and 
legislatures. The current law is unclear as to the extent that 
easement holders can make environmentally rational decisions to 
modify existing agreements. This potentially frustrates both 
conservation goals and other legitimate public policies such as new 
energy development. Settling this issue will involve a careful, 
thoughtful balancing of conservation values, property rights, 
flexibility concerns, the proper role of federal tax law as a driver of 
state conservation law, and other policy concerns. Those with 
conflicting viewpoints need to engage in open, productive dialogue 
to reach a resolution.  
Finally, conservation easements are perpetual land interests. As 
time passes, it is inevitable that changes in technology, the 
environment, societal needs, and the economy will create questions 
as to whether a given new energy development is permitted on 
conservation easement land. It is important for all the players—the 
fee owner, the easement owner, counsel, the community and 
broader stakeholders, and decision makers—to recognize that the 
dispute invokes large and nuanced public policies and to craft 
solutions accordingly.  
